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Abstract
Reflecting on my past two unsettling journeys of teaching in China and America
produces questions about the teaching of truth in chapter one. The question of truth as it
relates to the teacher’s role in the classroom raises not only issues of what and how we
should teach, but challenges the very purpose of teaching. When I explored Martin
Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective on (un)truth for insights into taken-for-
granted assumptions about education and the purposes of teaching and learning, I noticed
a strong resonance between his notion of “clearing” and the essential spirit of Taoism,
“the Tao of inaction.” This led me to coin the word, “en-teaching” to express my idea of
how teachers can teach through paradoxically non-teaching, without implying a binary
opposition between teaching and non-teaching.
In reviewing selected literature critical of the “teaching-as-telling” in America and
China, I suggest in chapter two that the traditional direct teaching of truth has been
entrenched in the public school systems in both countries as not only a teaching method
but an implicit educational culture. The essence of this “teaching-as-telling” in both
countries is the same – the will to control.
What alternatives might there be to the method of teaching-as-telling? How can
we teach otherwise? Or can we? Since I struggle with the question of truth related to
teaching and this question “assumes the greatest urgency in Heidegger’s thought” (Sallis,
20), chapter three focuses on Heidegger’s complex explorations of (un)truth in clearings
between brightness and darkness along with his concept of “let learn” through “always-
being-in-the-world.”
In chapter four, I go further to explore my notion of en-teaching based upon
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Heidegger’s thoughts of teaching and learning with insights from Lao Tzu and Dewey. In
the last chapter, I try to not only reflect upon all previous chapters but respond to the




Introduction: A Long Unsettling Journey into Teaching
A Long Difficult Journey of Teaching
This is a secret that most of my closest friends and mentor teachers do not know:
Education never appeared among the major choices on my application form for universities and
colleges before I entered into the major of education fourteen years ago. My biggest dream for
future life when I graduated from high school was to become a tour guide travelling around the
world. When applying to universities, I chose majors of different foreign languages such as
French, German, Spanish and Japanese. (Un)fortunately, my scores on the university entrance
examination were high enough to have me selected by East China Normal University (ECNU)
and then assigned to the department of “Pedagogy.”1 Although feeling deeply frustrated when I
received the admission offer, I still accepted it; after all, this was the best normal university in the
south of China. Two years later a critical incident happened that almost changed my life.
In my senior year in education at ECNU, I began my first real teaching experience: I was
assigned to intern as a teacher of English in a fourth grade in one of the most renowned public
elementary schools in Shanghai. At first I was very excited by this precious teaching opportunity
and at the same time I felt quite confident, for I thought I had been well equipped with a great
variety of pedagogical knowledge and skills through educational courses taken in curriculum,
instruction, psychology, philosophy, and schooling. Once I entered the school, however, I found
the real world I encountered was never the one I imagined.  If I were asked at that time “What
does it mean to teach in school?” after the three months teaching internship, I would say,
1 Both top normal and military universities in China have first priorities to choose their undergraduate students
unless students specify clearly on application forms that they do not want to attend either of these universities. Since
those universities usually provide free tuitions and stable job offers, most high school graduates would not reject
them.
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In real school life, teaching means to methodically address every behavioral
objective in your lesson plan before class and then try to accomplish all of them in
class, one after another. Teaching means to discipline students to be good listeners,
to attend to every word from the mouth of the teacher, and to push students to
grasp all “essentials” required by curriculum developers. Teaching also includes
orienting students to perform multiple irrelevant daily routines in school what
must be finished on time not only for school board members but also for officials
in local and general Education Commissions.
In short, teaching, in this frame, is a sophisticated set of technologies pertaining to so called
“basics,” those most corresponding to high stakes testing, programming students’ minds in the
quickest and most efficient way. In addition, teaching is so highly competitive that one’s career is
arbitrarily ended if the good academic performance of students – demonstrated by their high test
scores – cannot be guaranteed.
At the end of my teaching internship, I realized that I clearly did not possess the qualities
that make a good teacher, or in some sense, a good jail guard. I could not look into my students’
eyes when announcing that all of today’s recesses were cancelled, due to the news that the class
did not get one of the first three places in the grades of midterm exams. I could not feel natural
requesting the PE or art teachers relinquish their classes for me to prepare the class for the
coming English contest. I could not repeat hundreds of times in class “Listen! I need your
absolute attention and silence to focus on this issue which will quite possibly appear on the
tests.” I could not yell at students who gossiped in class or send them to stand in the garbage can
in the corner of the classroom. I could not force students to stay in class after school to rewrite
the English words they misspelled in homework or pop quizzes at least another fifty times. I
could not help being afraid of the possibility that one day I would do all these things in my
classroom without feeling any guilt.
I began to feel pessimistic and even desperate about my future teaching career: Could I
survive in the real school life which looks so much like a huge absorbing black hole? It was at
3
that moment that I was determined to carry on my studies to graduate school. The reason was
simple: according to the policies of public universities in China at that time, no student was
allowed to change his or her major. After I graduated from “Pedagogy,” I would have only two
choices: to become a school teacher or continue my studies to the graduate level. Without any
hesitation, I rejected the former and chose the latter. I worked very hard in all course work after I
came back to the university. Receiving the highest graduation GPA in the department exempted
me from taking the entrance test for graduate school. Each year, each department allows one
undergraduate student to be exempted from the entrance test. It is assumed this student would
choose the graduate major in the same department. I became the exception in my department of
Pedagogy, the only exception in the last twenty years.
Honestly, after my teaching internship experience, I was so frightened of a school
teaching career that I tried to avoid any graduate study possibly relevant to my major. In my
home university, “Pedagogy” and “Curriculum & Instruction” were the only two departments for
education majors. Even though I was not clear what the department of “Curriculum &
Instruction” was about, I chose it. When I was asked by the graduate advisor in the C&I
department which major I wanted to choose between the two major fields of curriculum and
instruction, I replied firmly, “No, not ‘instruction’ in any specific subject. Curriculum sounds fine
to me.” I said to myself, “No, nothing directly related to teaching.” This is the whole story of
how I chose my major of “curriculum theory.” Even now the chair of department of Pedagogy
does not forgive my switching departments; since then, the department developed the policy that
the undergraduate student who is exempted from graduate testing must continue in the graduate
major in the same department.
Graduate study in curriculum theory in my home university was, in brief, a happy
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experience for me. I was very satisfied with my life in the ivory tower: reading, writing and
conversing with mentor professors and colleagues in the academic field. Before graduation, I
refused job offers in schools and research institutes and finally found a position as editor with a
famous educational publisher in Shanghai. Then another big change occurred in my life. I was
recommended by my major professor to continue my graduate study in curriculum theory in the
United States. For me, this meant a future career life as a university faculty in education. In my
limited understanding, educational faculty research was much more important than teaching.
Besides, I thought university teaching would be quite different from teaching in K-12 schools. I
happily accepted the offer and began my adventure in the Ph.D. program in curriculum studies at
Louisiana State University
The ensuing learning experience was a fresh and exciting one for me. At the end of my
second year of study, however, I was informed that I must teach a sophomore course, “EDCI
2030: Teaching, School & Society,” to continue with my graduate assistantship. This big news
shocked me in two ways: How could I teach such a course to a group of American students in
their cultural context as a foreigner? I am not an English native speaker and, at the same time, I
had a fear of teaching. In the night before teaching my first class, I turned and tossed in bed and
could not fall asleep. The next morning, just before I left for the class, my current major
professor came to my office to comfort me, “Jie, I’ll tell you a secret that my professor told me
before my first formal presentation: just take all of your audiences as watermelons.” After the
class, he came again to ask how I felt about the class, and I told him, “Dr. Doll, you forgot to tell
me that all of my watermelons have eyes.” I spent a lot of time in preparing for teaching that
class. Before the semester began, I talked to the instructor who used to teach that class for advice
and borrowed her syllabus along with the texts she used. I wrote a lesson plan for each class that
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were so detailed that I tried to take down every word I would say in class even including the
jokes, and then I recited them time and time again. When I try to recall my first teaching that
semester, my only comment is “a disaster.” Often, when I thought I had prepared enough content
to teach the class for more than two hours, I finished all in thirty minutes and then did not know
what to do to get through the next sixty minutes. The more I pursued a perfect teaching
performance, the more mistakes I made in the classroom. In their evaluations, at the end of
semester, the students criticized not only my English with Chinese accent, but also my teaching.
This was a huge blow to me. Six years before, I had failed in my first teaching experience
in school and then chose to withdraw back to university life – I locked that unhappy experience
into a black box and threw it in the corner of my memory to try to avoid touching it again in my
future life. This time, though, I did not want to surrender so easily. Six years before, the teaching
internship took just three months, but now it was the beginning of my teaching here. I had failed
two times but did not want to fail again and again in my teaching career.
Critical Reflections on “Failures”
I dug out from the very bottom of my piles and piles of file archives the journals, reports,
log sheets and other field artifacts I had kept from six years before and put them together, along
with all of my teaching materials and students’ evaluations from that last semester. When I went
back to reflect carefully on every critical moment and incident in both teaching situations, I
gradually found many things I had not recognized or noticed before.
Before the first intern teaching in China, I took the teaching methods courses required for
all student teachers in which the texts of Johann F. Herbart and Ralph W. Tyler dominated.
Specifically, Herbart’s “Five Steps” from preparation, presentation, association, and
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generalization to application and Tyler’s Rationale from setting objectives, experiences,
organization to evaluations became the “Ten Commandments” that we were to engrave into our
minds and strictly follow step by step in preparing lesson plans and teaching classes.
At the beginning of my first teaching experience, I completely followed the timeline of
the teaching plan handed over to me from my mentor teacher, the real English teacher of that
class. I carefully researched her lesson plans and observed her classroom teaching to imitate her
style in my own teaching, not just by her request, but in the hope of pleasing her for a good grade
on my teaching internship. In my second teaching experience, I just copycatted the whole
syllabus from the previous instructor of that course; since I was actually not familiar with most
of the texts I was using in class, I often just summarized the major points of the texts to present
them to my students. In both teaching experiences, in my lesson plans, I always laid down in
great details the objectives I wanted to achieve for my students through my teaching; or
specifically, the “basics” or “essentials” my students were expected to grasp by the end of class.
Those objectives could be “Know the meanings of the first six English words in Lesson 2 and
spell them correctly,” “Grasp the use of What questions,” “Be aware of the major arguments of
the Big Five educational philosophies,” “Understand the concepts of ‘formal curriculum,’ ‘null
curriculum,’ and ‘hidden curriculum,’” etc. I was focused on my own “teaching” of the
“curriculum,” a pre-laid running track for students to cover in order for them to reach the finish
line, rather than on students’ responses to it – the “currere,” 2 their lived experience running on
that track, or specifically, the students’ actual learning. In other words, I put too much emphasis
on the direct teaching of so called knowledge, truth or facts from a textbook or syllabus, taking
2 Compared with the notion of curriculum as a static running track, William Pinar (1975) understands curriculum in
its Latin root of “currere” – the curriculum in the active and verb form. Madeline Grumet (1976) argues that currere
seeks to know “the experience of the running of one particular runner, on one particular track, on one particular day,
in one particular wind” (36).
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Figure 1.1 Waiting for Superman
for granted that students came with
“empty” minds. This reminds me of the
documentary movie, Waiting for
Superman (2010), which radically
critiques the American public education,
claims that the secret of good education
should be “simple”: “A teacher in school
should be filling her students with knowledge and sending them on the way.” It describes such an
“inspiring” image of teaching: after the teacher pours “knowledge” into the student’s head, the
student’s face becomes enlightened with angel’s wings appearing and unfolding on his back.
Nel Noddings (2007) argues that such direct teaching in our current schooling system is
concerned with the question “Has Johnny learned X?” rather than with another far more
interesting question, “What has Johnny learned?” (5) – “When we say that ‘students will do X’ as
a result of our instruction, we often forget to add, ‘if they want to’” (55). Maxine Greene (1995)
claims that this “‘top-down’ teaching and supervision has to be questioned” (89). William Doll
thinks that this teaching just focuses upon “what is taught” rather than “who is taught.”3 I think
this traditional direct teaching of knowledge does violence not only to students but also to
teachers, for it ignores not only “who is taught” but also “who is teaching.”  Teachers, to some
extent, become mere mediums through which the basics or essentials are transferred from
textbooks to students. These factors may contribute to what bell hooks calls (1994) “a serious
crisis in education: students do not want to learn and teachers do not want to teach” (12). In this
context, both teaching and learning turn into boring, unhappy and even traumatic experiences for
teachers and students. This is echoed by the critique of John Dewey (1963/1938) that students
3 Personal communication in the summer of 2007.
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would “associate the learning process with ennui and boredom” (27).
Furthermore, John Dewey and Evelyn Dewey (1915) state in “Schools of To-Morrow”
that as students resist this teaching-as-telling,4 many teachers “even go so far as to assume that
the mind is naturally averse to learning – which is like assuming that the digestive organs are
averse to food and have either to be coaxed or bullied into having anything to do with it” (4). In
other words, as many educators implicitly or explicitly believe, our students need to be taught to
learn, they forget that learning should be as natural a thing for children as food is to a human’s
digestive organs. The food metaphor reminds me of the spinach story told by Gregory Bateson
(1972). When Bateson taught an informal course for psychiatric residents in the Veterans
Administration Hospital at Palo Alto, one of the questions he gave to the class for discussion was:
A certain mother habitually rewards her small son with ice cream after he eats his
spinach. What additional information would you need to be able to predict
whether the child will: a. Come to love or hate spinach; b. Love or hate ice cream,
or c. Love or hate Mother? (xvii)
When I read this question raised by Bateson, I paused for a long time at that page. In our schools,
who is that mother? What is the ice cream? And spinach? What would be the result? Can it be
questioned why the boy needs to eat spinach? If not, what else can he eat? How can one promote
a healthy eating habit without the stimulus of ice cream?
Too often our teachers teach in school as that mother behaves, arbitrarily assuming what
is the best for their children to learn or eat without considering or asking children’s own opinions.
Even if teachers recognize children’s disinterest in what is taught, the spinach, usually they
would offer the attractive reward of ice cream for eating spinach – “to cover it [subject material]
with sugar-coating; to conceal its barrenness by intermediate and unrelated material; and finally,
4 I borrow the phrase of “teaching-as-telling” from Donna Trueit and Sarah Smitherman’s (2006) “Beyond Teaching-
as-Telling: Occasioning Conversation” in which they quote Kimball Wiles’ questioning that “Is teaching for efficient
learning directing and telling?” (quoted from Wiles, 1952, 10).
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as it were, to get the child to swallow and digest the unpalatable morsel while he is enjoy tasting
something quite different” (Dewey, 1990/1956, 208).
In my two teaching experiences, I had been familiar with the use of these tricky methods
of sugar-coating to persuade students to eat spinach with the attraction of ice cream – to allure or
force them to learn what is taught to them under the reward or pressure or punishment of grades.
In fact, these are in some sense very efficient teaching methods, especially when a teacher is
under high pressure to cover a certain amount of material in time for standardized testing. The
questions Bateson raises at the end of the spinach story, however, pushes me to ponder upon
what I had never thought of before, the results of such teaching. Will students come to love or
hate what they are persuaded or even forced to learn? What will they think of the sugar-coating
method, or ice cream, the reward for boring learning? How will they think of their teachers using
the tricks? The following arguments from Dewey (1963/1938) might answer these questions:
Perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies is the notion that a person learns
only the particular thing he is studying at the time. Collateral learning in the way
of formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be and often is much
more important than the spelling lesson or lesson in geography or history that is
learned. For these attitudes are fundamentally what count in the future. The most
important attitude that can be formed is that of desire to go on learning. (48,
emphasis added)
When a good-intentioned mother forces her little boy to eat the spinach even with a
reward of ice cream, she forgets the boy might thus hardly feel happy during those meals and
never eat spinach or other vegetables when he can freely choose what to eat. This can also apply
to teaching and learning, as Dewey quotes from an American humorist “It makes no difference
what you teach a boy so long as he doesn’t like it” (1966/1916, 134). Dewey is absolutely right
that the “collateral learning” of “enduring attitudes of likes and dislikes” is much more
significant than the actual content of learning. Unfortunately, few of us as teachers have
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genuinely realized this.
This external top-down control in traditional direct teaching is also evident in the
unquestioning acceptance of curriculum, the reduction of curriculum to a detailed list of
behavioral objectives listed in the teachers’ lesson plans. As written, behavioral objectives
specify exactly “what students will do, to what level of proficiency, and under what sort of
assessment,” Noddings (2007) critiques that the lesson plans are “no longer supposed to
emphasize what the teacher would do, but, rather, what students were expected to do as a result
of instruction” (53). One of the greatest dangers of this, according to Dewey (1910), is that
students’ chief concern becomes to accommodate themselves to teachers’ expectations rather
than to passionately engage with what to learn: “‘Is this right?’ comes to mean ‘Will this answer
or process satisfy the teacher?’” (50). Therefore all students’ learning is directed to induce
correct responses on high stakes testing. In other words, the boy eats the spinach just to get the
ice cream or please his mother, not for its healthy ingredients.
Much worse is that under the heavy pressure of teaching-as-telling for testing, often
teachers forget to double check whether the spinach they are required to feed their students is
fresh enough to eat. I really wonder and worry that, even if teachers find that the spinach is rotten
in “inert” knowledge or facts (borrowing Whitehead’s phrase, 1967/1929, Chap. 1), they would
still feel obliged to feed students the moldy spinach. Then, where is the remedy for the mother
and boy in that metaphoric story? How can mothers help their children build habits of healthy
and balanced diets, and teachers help their students learn with passion in a non-behavioristic way?
How can teaching be not just all about telling and passive listening?
At the end of his book “Mind and Nature” (2002/1979), Bateson questions, “As teachers,
are we wise?” (210, emphasis added). This is a question deserving deep pondering on the part of
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all educators. While we question the authoritative teaching role of teachers, are there any
alternatives to, and challenges of, what we typically think of as teaching, specifically traditional
direct teaching, in classroom settings? This led me to another journey, that of “en-teaching.”
Another Unsettling Journey, to “En-Teaching”
Since I began to look back, and to reflect critically, on those two unsuccessful teaching
experiences, I have been engaged in a difficult struggle with the question, “What makes a teacher,
especially a good teacher?” In other words, what can I, as a teacher, teach to my students, and
how can I teach it if I want to be a good teacher? This seems to be a simple question for a person
whose major field of study has been education for about fourteen years. But it is definitely not
simple for me. I tried a lot of changes in teaching my LSU EDCI 2030 class. In the following
semester, I had an almost completely new syllabus. I chose the texts that I felt brought forth my
passion on the issues of teaching and learning, and put these into the students’ reading packet.
Both the midterm exam and the final exam were removed, for I thought – and still think – these
to be not only useless but a waste of time in encouraging students to just mechanically memorize
the “right” answers of all review questions before the exam while aiming for good grades.
Instead, final group projects on self-chosen topics that interest all group members were added to
the syllabus. The format of the class was then much more oriented toward conversations between
student and teacher, student and student, rather than dominant lecturing by the instructor…
These changes were not a smooth shift and continue to represent a struggle for me. But at
least now I have become much more comfortable with the mistakes I still occasionally make in
teaching. While I experimented with different changes in teaching my class, I also gradually built
up my critical, reflexive thoughts on teaching through playing with the ideas of a great variety of
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educational scholars and with their different conceptualizations of teaching. To name just a few
of them:  John Dewey, William Doll, Paulo Freire, Maxine Greene, bell hooks, Nel Noddings
and Alfred North Whitehead. As I read these wonderful theorists’ various critiques of traditional
direct teaching practices and expectations of how we could teach, I felt so deeply in my heart the
need of a new conceptualization, a new vocabulary to express a different teaching.
While I tried to find possible alternatives to direct teaching, I began by examining the
spinach as knowledge or truth handed over to students in that metaphoric story narrated by
Bateson (1972). In my first lesson in my educational major fourteen years ago, one of my
professors told me, “As teachers, our first and foremost responsibility is to teach truth to our
students.” Even now I can recall so clearly his passionate lecture in that class: “We teachers
should be the most faithful preachers as shepherd to guide our helpless lambs in the light of truth:
this is why our profession of education is called enlightenment.” That was such inspiring and
touching advice for me at that time that I began to imagine my future career as the hero leading
the blind out of the black world into the light, as in Plato’s cave allegory. But reflections on my
past teaching experiences raised more and more questions in my mind on the direct teaching of
so called truth. I began to wonder: Do we, as teachers, really possess such a thing called truth, as
spinach to feed our students? What does truth mean for us and for our students? Is our major job
to teach such truth to students? If yes, how can we teach truth? If not, what should we teach,
outside the box of absolute truth? …
The question of truth as it relates to the teacher’s role in the classroom raises not only
issues of what and how we should teach, but challenges the very purpose of teaching. Since truth
itself is a major question of phenomenology, I choose to use the works of German philosopher
Martin Heidegger for his phenomenological treatment of truth with the hope that it can shed
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some important light on the fundamental questions of teaching and learning.
When I explored Heidegger’s dis-rupting5 explorations of the essence of truth for insights
into taken-for-granted assumptions about education and the purpose of teaching and learning, I
felt more and more a resonance to his phenomenological perspective on (un)truth, especially the
notion of “clearing,” which can be aligned with one essential spirit of Chinese Taoism,
“inaction” (无为). This western-eastern connection or bridging enabled me to reexamine both
concepts from different perspectives for genuinely new insights.
My further study of Taoist inaction led me to coin the word, “en-teaching” to express my
idea of how teachers can teach through paradoxically non-teaching, without implying a binary
opposition between teaching and non-teaching. In the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2004),
the application of the prefix en- in French and hence in English is usually used to form verbs
from nouns, adjectives or other verbs in which the notion of “against” rarely or never occurs
(468). 6 In this sense, en-teaching not only does not suggest the opposition of teaching/not
teaching, but focuses on teaching as a verb, a dynamic being in relation, rather than a noun, say,
a technical work or task to be completed on time.7 The hyphen in en-teaching suggests both the
rupture and relation between en-teaching and teaching – a dynamic and generative space full of
5 The use of the hyphen reflects the complex way Heidegger uses concepts such as “disrupt” to include the process,
action, and relationships in this case of disrupting.
6 In OED, from 14th century on, the prefixes of in-(im-) and en-(em-) have been frequently substituted for each other.
In the 17th century, the form in- (im-) was generally preferred but the now prevailing use is en- (em-) in English.
7 I suggest en-teaching, to some degree, is closely related to the essence of teaching. Similarly, Heidegger
(1993/1949) says, the essence of house or a state is not “a generic type” but “the ways in which house and state hold
sway, administer themselves, develop, and decay—the way they “essentially unfold” (wesen)” (335). Then he turns
to an old word John Peter Hebel uses in his poem, “Ghost on Kanderer Street,” die Weserei—“It means the city hall,
inasmuch as there the life of the community gathers and village existence is constantly in play, i.e., essentially
unfolds. It is from the verb wesen that the noun is derived” (335). In this sense, the essence of teaching is not a noun,
say, a general formula, a set of criteria or behavioral objectives, a list of issues or items that can be summarized or
defined to be applied to all, but a verb, en-teaching that is “constantly in play.” Therefore, my use of the prefix of
“en-” is different from its use in the words such as “enframe,” “enclose,” and “encapsulate” in the sense of putting
all things inside a fixed framework.
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useful tensions. This view of teaching opens up as a phenomenological way of being in the
classroom described by en-teaching, and has significant implications not only for relationships in
the classroom including students’ relationships with content and knowing, but also for (using a
metaphor from Ted Aoki, 2005) a “lived curriculum.”
In my further exploration of en-teaching, I try to play with the concepts offered by all
those educational theorists previously mentioned to tap into the “not-yet” possibilities of en-
teaching through a cacophony of different conceptualizations of teaching with a special focus on
the following three research questions: What is en-teaching? How does en-teaching differ from
traditional direct teaching?  What are the curriculum and classroom implications of en-teaching
especially drawn from the complex conversations between Heidegger, Dewey and Lao Tzu? I
also hope this lens of en-teaching can help teachers view their traditional teaching responsibility
differently, and thus see other possibilities of teaching in en-teaching.
My explorations of en-teaching in this dissertation take the following general form:
Chapter one is an introduction; Chapter two is a literature review of direct teaching in both
America and China; Chapter three explores Heidegger’s concepts of teaching and learning,
especially his own exploration of (un)truth as clearings between light and darkness; Chapter four
develops the notion of en-teaching, built upon Heidegger’s notion of teaching with additional
insights from Dewey and Lao Tzu; Chapter five is a summation.
Methodology: An Autoethnographic Approach
One of my primary initiatives in conducting this project of en-teaching is to give myself a
precious opportunity to go back to my past teaching experiences, especially the first two
unsuccessful ones. I want to tell stories, my own stories of teaching and learning as both are so
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intimately and inseparably intertwined with each other. Along with theoretical analyses of
different conceptualizations of en-teaching, I use my personal stories of critical incidents or
moments through my educational experiences to maintain that generative tension between theory
and practice8 in a recursive loop. I believe that no matter how great a theoretical argument
sounds, if it cannot speak to me through my own experience to finally flow into my blood, it
would be dumb to me. If my writing project in this dissertation is a never finished necklace in
progress, the theoretical analytical line would be the string going through sparkling pearls of
small narratives collected from my past memories of teaching and learning. Furthermore, in this
critical self study or examination, I try to talk to myself in different teaching modes in multi-I
conversations. There is no intention of making the overly simple, arrogant or quick judgment that
I am wiser than or superior to others. In other words, this is not intended to be an “inspiring”
story of “improvement,” or one illustrating movement from failure to success.
In my first drafts of this section, I had “autobiography” as one of the methodologies since
I planned to tell my own life stories. It was during my writing process that I ran into Carolyn
Ellis’s fascinating work on autoethnography. I felt such a strong resonance between this
methodology and what I wanted to do in this dissertation that finally I switched my primary
methodology from autobiography to autoethnography.
John Creswell (2007) says autoethnography is an approach gaining prominence in
qualitative research championed by Carolyn Ellis and others. Carolyn Ellis and Arthur Bochner
(2000) claim that the term “autoethnography” has been in circulation for over two decades as “an
8 As for the generative tension between theory and practice, Pinar and Grumet (1981) argue, “Too often has
educational theory been reduced to a form of idealism that must be instantly transformed into activity. Although the
field situation provides a context where our theory and practice confront one another, our goal is not to resolve their
differences, not to reduce one to the dimensions of the other. Rather, we play one against the other so as to disclose
their limitations, and in so doing enlarge in capacity and intensity the focus of each” (37-38). In this sense, I do not
intend to erase the dynamic tension between theory and practice or reduce either of them to the other, but try to play
with that generative tension.
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autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness,
connecting the personal to the cultural” (739) – a move “from traditional ethnography to writing
ethnography of the self as an evocative, unfolding, scenic, and dialogic plot” (Ellis, 2009, 32). In
some sense, autoethnography lies in the overlapping area between ethnography and narrative
inquiry, specifically autobiography, as it is often regarded as part of those qualitative research
genres.
Autoethnography is a method to study the self by exposing the self to not only oneself,
but also to readers through telling personal evocative stories. Ellis and Bochner (2000) argue that
all these stories need “to be used rather than analyzed; to be told and retold rather than theorized
and settled; to offer lessons for further conversation rather than undebatable conclusions; and to
substitute the companionship of intimate detail for the loneliness of abstracted facts” (744). This
means that the use of personal stories in autoethnography does not merely aim to prove or draw
any final theoretical conclusion through rational analyses, but push people to feel, think and
question in a tension that can never be resolved. In some sense, personal emotions play a more
important role than rational logic in autoethnography. Besides, when I write my life stories
emotionally and spiritually from my “gut,” I have to, at the same time, open myself to my
readers, and turn myself inside out, thus confront criticisms of not only how I write, but also how
I live – a vulnerable and dangerous writing. Ellis (2009) writes:
I hoped that readers would see my focus on self as an avenue to learn from my
candor and vulnerability. Necessarily, the exposure had to include betrayals,
uncertainties, and self-doubt, including doubt about what was actually written. I
wanted readers to trust that I had started with what I did not know and discovered
what I did know through the process of writing. As an honest writer, I never
pretended to have it all worked out, or to suggest that the finished product
disclosed the ‘bare truth’ (108)
While Ellis talks about the “betrayals, uncertainties, and self-doubt” in autoethnographic writings,
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she touches upon one of the most important demands for autoethnographers – self-questioning.
This is a difficult process for it can generate a lot of fears, emotional pains, and even
humiliations. I have felt this heavy pressure even before I really began writing the first chapter of
my dissertation.
This is the fifth year of my teaching that sophomore course in our department. Now I can
feel at ease and even proud to chat with my friends, professors and family, both here in the
United States and in China, about my current teaching experience, even though I still have many
struggles and difficulties with(in) it. I would be glad or proud to let them know the news that I
got 4.7 out of 5 in the students’ evaluations of my class at the end of last semester, the comments
my students wrote to express how they appreciate my class, and the “Thank You” card I just
received from a student who took my class one year ago and now enters the graduate teacher
education program. At the same time, I am not so willing to show my difficult struggles or
problems I encounter in teaching. I also had tried my best to hide my first two big teaching
failures from everybody including myself although I used them in self-critical reflections to help
my future teaching – they are just like two deep scars in my heart that I had been so hesitant to
let people see. I want everybody that I know and knows me to believe that I am always a good
teacher, not a poor one.
How could I let other people see my dark side that I want to bury deep into my memory?
This is really a great challenge for me. There are, however, rewards along with the danger or
vulnerability of revealing one’s self to others: “you come to understand yourself in deeper ways.
And with understanding yourself comes understanding others. Autoethnography provides an
avenue for doing something meaningful for yourself and the world” (Ellis & Bochner, 2000,
738). I finally decided to share with my colleagues not only my conceptualization of en-teaching
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but my experiences of failure in direct teaching. Since autoethnography is concerned with
personal narrative, it is never only about the self – it tries to understand self in a cultural context.
Ellis (2009) quotes Mykhalovskiy who declares that “To write about self is to write about social
experience” and then questions “If culture circulates through all of us, then how can
autoethnography not connect to a world beyond the self?” (34) As a subsystem of the society, our
schools are never ivory towers where teaching and learning occur – we are always teaching and
learning contextually in particular cultural systems at particular historical moments. This is also
why I choose to do literature reviews of traditional direct teaching in China and the United States.
Since our stories are shaped and made more sense of in our cultural context, it is not only
important but necessary to put any “personal” narrative in a much larger cultural background.
Further, Ellis continues,
Good autoethnography works toward a community, where we might speak
together of our experiences, find commonality of spirit, companionship in our
sorrow, balm for our wounds, and solace in reaching out to those in need as well.
As Coles (1989, p. 22) says, a good story is one that others can take in and use for
themselves. (229-230)
In other words, a good story can be useful for not only the story teller as a personal narrative of
the self but the whole group or community. I believe what I experienced, am experiencing and
will experience as a teacher in my personal narratives of teaching is not completely unique to me
– I see now and in the future that the traumatic experience I had in traditional direct teaching and
the possibilities of en-teaching could also belong to other teachers. I hope my telling and sharing
of this autoethnographic account on my teaching experiences can help my colleague teachers as,





Literature Review of Teaching-as-Telling 
Education is not an affair of “telling” and being told. 
--John Dewey, 1966/1916, 38 
 
To act in front of students as if the truth belongs only to the teacher is not only 
preposterous but also false. 
 --Paulo Freire, 2001, 39 
 
We operate from the givens, follow acceptable procedures, and derive objective 
and certain truths that are already stated within the conditions of inquiry. 
--M. Jayne Fleener, 2002, 191 
 
I clearly remember the following passionate argument made by one of the professors I 
had when I first entered the major of education: “As teachers, our first and foremost 
responsibility is to teach truth to our students. We should be the most faithful preachers as 
shepherds to guide our helpless lambs in the light of truth: this is why our profession of 
education is called enlightenment.” From this professor’s perspective, knowledge is truth and it 
can be taught, simply, by telling.
1
  
Reflecting on my past two unsettling journeys of teaching produces questions in my mind 
about the teaching of truth: What is truth? What are the relations of truth, teaching and learning? 
While I struggle with these questions of truth related to teaching, my educational experience as 
both teacher and student in China and the United States intricately resonate with each other. In 
this chapter, from the vast field of literature dealing with teaching methods, I review selected 
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 In the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2004), truth is defined as “The quality or state of being true: that which 
is true as opposed to false; a fact or belief that is accepted as true” (1549) and knowledge as “1. Information and 
skills acquired through experience or education: the sum of what is known; true, justified belief, as opposed to 
opinion. 2. Awareness or familiarity gained by experience” (789). Apparently, both have the same connotation of 




literature critical of traditional direct teaching in both America and China and suggest the essence 




           Literature Review of the Critiques of Traditional Direct Teaching in the United 
           States  
One of the saddest features of contemporary education [is that] much of what is 
offered in schools is promptly forgotten, and this is true at every level… Year 
after year, we hear critics wailing over the results of various surveys that show 
convincingly that high school graduates do not know the dates of the Civil War or 
who fought whom in World War II. But we do teach these things… Our response 
to this state of affairs is to press harder, retain children in grade 3 until they pass a 
standardized test (which some may never do), and refuse diplomas to high school 
students who cannot prove that they know what we take to be important facts. But 
even if test scores were to rise (and they might, minimally), the material would be 
mostly forgotten after the test.  
--Nel Noddings, 2006, 23, emphasis original 
 
“Are you doing good today in school, honey?” I asked Tracy, age 4, since she seemed 
unhappy when I picked her up from the Pre-K class. She quietly took out a blue folder from her 
backpack and gave it to me. Then I knew what had happened, and unsurprisingly, Tracy got a sad 
face on the daily conduct chart in the folder with a note on the bottom, “Tracy giggled with 
Louisa in the bathroom before lunch and used outside voice in the dance center activity this 
afternoon.” I looked up from that note to Tracy, and she quickly blurted out, “Believe me, Mom, 
I will behave myself in the future.” I smiled, “Do you know what it means to behave yourself?” 
“Of course, I know. It means I am supposed to be a good listener of Ms. Murphy.” After a short 
pause, she added, “And I will not move anywhere in class.” Looking into Tracy’s earnest eyes, I 
suddenly did not know how to respond. I closed the blue folder and looked at its cover, a list of 
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 This refers to Heidegger’s (1993/1949) phrase of “the will to mastery” in criticizing the essence of modern 




“First 9 Weeks Skills,” including objectives like, “Identify at least eight uppercase or lowercase 
letters in random order,” “Counts by ones to 10 orally,” and “Identifies rectangles, squares, 
circles, and triangles using concrete models.” 
The next day Tracy came back home very happily with a smiley face on her conduct chart. 
I, however, was not happier than the previous day, because I was not sure that was exactly what I 
wanted my little Tracy to get from school. As I look forward to Tracy’s excellence in the areas 
listed by school as “letter, sound, number, shape, and social recognitions,” I hope Tracy can learn 
not just these things or merely be a good listener in the classroom and that her teachers will not 
always “operate from the givens, follow[ing] acceptable procedures.” My worry is that if 
education becomes just “an affair of ‘telling’ and being told” for Tracy, she might have to face 
the crisis or danger presented in the quotation by Nel Noddings on contemporary education. As 
students are taught to be good listeners, they become perfect empty vessels for teachers to fill 
with so called truth or knowledge. This traditional direct teaching is criticized by Paulo Freire 
(2000/1970) as banking education in which “the scope of action allowed to the students extends 
only as far as receiving, filling, and storing the deposits” (72). In this metaphor, truth is viewed 
as a fixed gift bestowed by the knowing teacher to the ignorant student and the teacher needs 
only to “operate from the givens, follow[ing] acceptable procedures.” Therefore, teaching 
becomes a mechanical top-down transfer from teacher to student. As I review the literature 
critical of teaching-as-telling and of learning-as-being-told, I identify three problematics relevant 
to my inquiry: 1) the teacher’s authoritative attitude, 2) pre-selected knowledge as truth in certain 
subject materials, and 3) students developing resistance to active learning.  
The first problematic, the authority of the teacher in traditional direct teaching, has been 




to be superior to students in the classroom, they often reject opinions different from their own: 
“The different becomes not an ‘other’ worthy of any respect, but a ‘this’ or ‘that’ to be despised 
and detested” (108). Freire (1998) argues, 
An educator’s authoritarianism is not only manifested in the repressive use of 
authority, which restricts the movements of the learners. It is equally manifested 
in a number of opportunities, in his or her excessive vigilance over the learners, in 
his or her lack of respect for the learners’ creativity, and for his or her cultural 
identity. It is also manifested in his or her lack of acceptance of the popular-class 
learners’ way of being, the manner in which he or she warns the students and 
censures them. An educator’s authoritarianism is also manifested within which the 
learners are restricted to the mechanical memorization of what the educator 
deposits in them. That is the ‘banking educators,’ as I termed him or her in 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed. (90-91) 
 
Unfortunately, I had quite a few such “banking” teachers who made their own voices the most 
important in the classroom. One of the disciplinary rules that was deeply imprinted in my mind 
since kindergarten is “Never ever interject in class without permission.” This means students 
must follow teachers’ instructions and never challenge the teacher’s authority. As Freire vividly 
describes the images of teachers’ “excessive vigilance over the learners,” I am reminded of 
platforms in my past schools. If you step into any K-12 classroom in China, you will find a 
raised platform, a dais, in the front of the classroom. When teachers stand on the dais, the 
message is that teachers are higher than students not only physically but intellectually – a symbol 
of authority or hierarchy.  
bell hooks (1994) thinks “part of what the banking system does for professors is to create 
the system where we feel that by the end of the semester every student will be sitting there filling 
out their evaluations testifying that I’m a ‘good teacher’” (154). She says we need to realize that 
the purpose of teaching is not to feel good about me or the class, for that cozy feeling could block 




authority in the classroom is that students begin to depreciate their own ability or potentials. 
hooks writes, 
I notice many students have difficulty taking seriously what they themselves have 
to say because they are convinced that the only person who says anything of note 
is the teacher. Even if another student does say something that the teacher says is 
good, helpful, smart, whatever, it’s only through the act of the teacher’s validating 
that the other students take note. If the teacher doesn’t seem to indicate that this is 
something worth noting, few students will… At what point does one say what 
someone else is saying ought not to be pursued in the classroom? (150) 
 
The question raised by hooks at the end of the above quotation is very powerful for me. Who has 
the right to decide what should/could be discussed in a classroom? And how? Martin Buber 
(1967) warns, 
since the educator has to such an extent replaced the master, the danger has arisen 
that the new phenomenon, the will to educate, may degenerate into arbitrariness, 
and that the educator may carry out his selection and his influence from himself 
and his idea of the pupil, not from the pupil’s own reality. (50, emphasis added)  
 
Since this “will to educate” easily leads to the arbitrariness of the teacher in determining what 
and how he wants to teach and thus influence his students,  the teacher has to be careful, not to 
be overly willful. Unfortunately, in traditional, direct teaching, it is the teacher who often makes 
arbitrary decisions of what should or should not be pursued in class and thus validating or 
invalidating students’ thinking, speaking, and/or acting.   
The second problematic, preselected knowledge as truth, comes forward in the Tyler 
Rationale and the behavioristic objective movement is spawned. Here teaching is reduced to a 
simple, mechanistic transfer of knowledge.  It is not coincidental that delineating “objectives” is 
the first step and in some sense the most significant one in the Tyler Rationale. About this 
priority of “objectives” in traditional teaching, Noddings (2007) writes, 
Most advocates of the current reform movement insist on a high degree of 




students must know exactly what they should learn. Notice that, under such a 
system, we can usually answer the question, Has Johnny learned X?—but we 
cannot answer the far more interesting question, What has Johnny learned? There 
is no encouragement in this system to invite students to follow different interests 
with respect to broad topic or support teachers in presenting exciting material that 
may or may not be learned. (5-6)  
 
When teachers pay attention to checking their students’ understanding – “Have you learned this 
or that?” rather than “What have you learned?” – a great many precious teachable moments and 
learning opportunities are missed. When Tracy has to count lots of objects time and time again in 
her class, she may finally be able to count by ones from one to ten, but my concern is what she 
might have learned otherwise if Ms. M., her teacher, was not pressured by, or perhaps even 
obsessed with, that list of “aims” on Tracy’s blue folder. Dewey (1966/1916) thinks this pursuit 
of “speedy, accurately measurable, correct results” requires that teachers not encourage students 
to deal with questions in diverse ways, thus restricting “their vision to the one path the teacher’s 
mind happens to approve” (175). As one hundred readers may imagine one hundred Hamlets, 
one hundred students can have at least one hundred ways of approaching the same problem. 
Teaching of the one and only shortcut to the problem merely restricts students’ creativity and 
imagination and thus erases rich potentials of what is not-yet. When overemphasis is placed upon 
the end point of that shortcut, the “right answer,” what is ignored is the dynamic process of the 
adventurous journey – “Our tragic error is that we are [so] anxious for the results of growth that 
we neglect the process of growing” (7).  
In the same vein, Noddings (2007) argues that chances of incidental learning are missed 
in this abbreviated process of growing: 
Incidental learning occurs in the course of conversation, as ideas are being 
developed. Incidental learning takes place without its being specified as an aim or 
objective... Obviously, we cannot depend on incidental learning for an entire 




by specifying one narrow objective for each lesson. It is good now and then (quite 
often, actually) to get off the main road and travel the byways, letting knowledge 
stick to us like burrs in the field, as Robert Frost describe the poet’s way of 
acquiring knowledge. (56-57)  
 
I especially appreciate Noddings’s suggestion that we occasionally “get off the main road and 
travel the byways, letting knowledge stick to us like burrs in the field.” In this runaway from the 
main road, both teachers and students inquire rather than merely acquire so called knowledge for 
particular objectives – serendipity may thus be encountered. Many public school teachers in the 
context of traditional direct teaching feel extremely confined by “set lesson plans where they 
have little choice about the content of the material they are required to teach,” where they are 
required to simply “relay information as though the work they do is akin to that of any worker on 
an assembly line” (hooks, 2003, 16). In this productivity model, teachers and students both are 
put under great pressure in regard to testing – everyone is concerned only with the question of 
how to get an A in the class rather than critically questioning why I need that A. This brings me to 
the third problematic related to traditional direct teaching – students developing resistance to 
learning, or the crisis hooks (1994) describes as “students do not want to learn and teachers do 
not want to teach” (12).  
In this serious crisis in education, hooks (2003) thinks learning becomes goal oriented – 
“It is not valued in itself but [only] as a means to something else” (173). Unfortunately, this 
echoes my current experience as a teacher educator. Many of the students are so smart that they 
know how to please their teacher and get the best evaluation at the end of semester. I encourage 
my students to feel free to ask any question in class, but the most frequent questions I get from 
them are about my grading scale, my specific requirements for an assignment – all concern 




the inevitable result of traditional direct teaching: the all-knowing teacher’s judgment of whether 
students achieve predetermined behavioral objectives becomes the ultimate criterion of both 
teaching and learning; therefore, grades are the highest and only confirmation of students’ 
learning.  
(H)ooks (2003) asserts that today’s US classrooms are more likely to be comprised of 
students who are “obsessed with grades and willing to do almost anything to ensure that they will 
get the evaluation that most boosts their future chances of success” (166). This orientation to 
future success encourages the crazy zeal for those so called right answers and therefore the 
student’s chief concern is to meet or exceed the teachers’ expectations rather than passionately 
engage with what is to be learned. Students themselves seem to understand their learning as an 
exchange: in return for correct answers and behavioral change, students get teachers’ praise, high 
test scores, good grades, and diplomas in the market of schooling. Therefore, students do not 
necessarily learn to learn, to search for and assess knowledge on their own. I find  the three 
problematics I have discussed reflect a depersonalization of  both teaching and learning, teachers 
and learners considered instrumentally, objectively, compelled to  limit their visions related to 
“enlightening” truth.   
After reviewing selected literature  critical of the “teaching-as-telling” in America,  I now 
turn to the literature relevant for the millions of classrooms in China, focusing on three major 
historical influences on teaching that led to the development of teaching-as-narrating, the 







Literature Review of the Dominant Teaching Method as Narrating in China 
As reported by the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, China now 
has over 160 million students and 10 million full time teachers in Grades 1-12 public schools.
3
 
Teaching is a major and culturally valued profession in China. Most of the literature on teaching 
I choose to review here is from widely used official texts for teacher education programs in 
public universities and colleges, or more directly, the so-called national textbook for millions of 
pre-service teachers.
4
 In this section, I focus on the tradition of “teaching-as-narrating” method 
which has been influential until now in China in different historical periods: 1) ancient China 
before the 19
th
 century, 2) modern China, 1902-1948, and 3) contemporary China from 1949 to 
the present.
5
 The method of “teaching-as-narrating” is also called, in Chinese educational texts, 
“expository method,” “narrating method,” “oral presentation method,” and “telling method.” I 
argue that as “teaching-as-narrating” developed historically in the Chinese educational tradition 
and culture, rather than being merely a teaching method – is, like the American “teaching-as-
telling” method, the dominant teaching mode. This narrating is essentially an authoritative telling.  
 
Ancient China, before the 19
th
 Century 
Teaching has a long history in China. As early as the Shang Dynasty, around the 14
th
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This data is from the official website of the Ministry of Education of P.R. China 
(http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s4958/index.html). Kindergarten is not in the formal 
schooling system in China.   
 
4
 The majority of higher educational institutions and almost all top ones in China are public. The following texts I 
use in this literature review section are specified on book covers as “National Textbook for universities and colleges: 
Educational Psychology” (Shao, 1997), “Theories of Instruction” (Shi & Cui, 2009/1999), “Theories of Instruction” 
(C. Wang, 2005), “Theories of Curriculum and Instruction” (B. Wang, 2009). 
 
5
 In this section, all literatures I review are in Chinese, so I have translated them into English. Since all translations 






of “Teaching” (教) 
(in Shi & Cui, 4) 
century B.C., the word, “teaching,” appeared in oracle characters (Shi & Cui, 2009/1999; C. 
Wang, 2005; B. Wang, 2008).
6
 In this section, I first trace “teaching” to the origin of the 
character in ancient Chinese language, then review the oldest theoretical work on teaching in 
China, and finally examine two of the most important influences upon the teaching tradition in 
China: Confucianism and Legalism.  
Like many other ancient Chinese written character systems, 
oracle characters were formed from one or more pictographs indicating 
meanings; the character, “teaching,” is not an exception. The oracle 
character of “teaching” on the left is similar to the contemporary one in 
Chinese, “教.” It describes well an ancient event of teaching:  a person, 
on the right, raises a stick up high to “teach” a child, on the left, math, as 
the two Xs above that child’s head represent the number “5” twice in oracle characters. It is not 
hard to find that the character of “teaching” evolves from that of “learning”: the right part of the 
oracle character of “teaching” is actually that of “learning,” a child learning the number 5. 
Moreover, in “Annotation and Interpretation” (2007/120), the character of “teaching” (教) is 
defined as “to follow what is given from above” while associated with teachers’ physical 
punishment and students’ filial piety and obedience (152).
7
 From the origins of the character of 
“teaching” in the ancient Chinese language, two things are striking: first, “teaching” originates 
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 Oracle characters were invented by the people of the Shang dynasty to cut in the shoulder bones of oxen or 
plastrons of turtle shells. They attempted to tell fortunes by exposing the oracle bone to fire to see the change of 
bone. About 4,500 oracle characters have now been extracted from oracle bones.  
 
7
 “Annotations and Interpretations” (《说文解字》) is the first dictionary in ancient China explaining Chinese 
characters based upon their structures and etymologies written by Shen Xu in Han Dynasty around 120. Until now, it 
is still one of the most influential dictionaries in use in China.  The original Chinese texts of the entry “teaching” (教) 





from “learning” and is intimately intertwined with “learning”; second, “teaching” has a strong 
authoritative sense of “telling” to which students must be listening in obedience. It has not 
always been so, however; as I explain (below) the earliest known meaning of teaching was 
subsequently transformed, first by Confucius and his followers, then through the influences of 
Confucianism and Legalism.  
So enmeshed are the characters of teaching and learning in ancient China that they even 
became interchangeable (Shui & Cui, 2009/1999, p. 7).  “On Learning” (《学记》) (2001/300 
B.C.) is the oldest theoretical work on teaching in the educational history of not only China but 
the world (C. Wang, 2005; B. Wang, 2009; Yuan, 2003/1998).
8
 It was written approximately 
23,000 years ago by disciples of Confucius based on educational thoughts and practices at that 
time.  This book has only 20 paragraphs consisting of 1229 characters but is very dense and rich, 
outlining the general aims and functions of education, curriculum designs of different types and 
levels of schooling, fundamental principles, methods of school administration, classroom 
instruction, educational evaluations, and teacher education, etc.  
On the topic of teaching, the ancient text “On Learning” states that teachers have to know 
what makes successful teaching as well as poor teaching, and then they can become good 
teachers (489).
9
 It says, as good singers tempt their audiences to sing together, good teachers 
should interest students to learn with them (490).
10
 Then it critiques that many teachers are so 
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 It is one of the most important classics in the history of China not just in the field of education. Therefore Chinese 
people for generations are familiar with its texts.  I put the original Chinese texts of all direct quotations taken from 
it in footnotes.   
 
9
 The original Chinese texts are “君子既知教之所由兴，又知教之所由废，然后可以为人师也.” 
10





focused on reading to students the texts which students are required to memorize that many 
students hate learning and their teachers (487).
11
 It says, therefore, once students graduate, they 
quickly forget what they’ve learned from schools (487).
12
 Finally, it advocates heuristic teaching: 
“Lead rather than prod students so that teachers and students can live in a relation of harmony; 
intrigue rather than dominate students so that students will not feel overwhelmed; enlighten 
rather than dictate students so that students can think independently and critically” (489).
13
 In 
addition, while it agrees that “teaching and learning are two sides of the same coin,” it claims 
that when teachers encounter difficulties in teaching, they begin to learn, so teaching and 
learning can promote each other (484).
14
 It concludes that only after learning this heuristic mode 
of teaching, can people become good teachers, and then good officers, good kings (490).
15
  
This heuristic mode of teaching, in “On Learning,” originates in China from the teachings 
of Confucius, challenging traditional authoritative teaching-as-telling (B. Wang, 2009; Yuan, 
2003/1998; Zhang, 2008). In “The Analects” (2007/300 B.C.), a collection of his conversations 
with disciples, Confucius argues that teachers should teach each student differently, trying to 
help students at the pivotal stage in which students want to articulate what they are learning but 
cannot say clearly – the critical point at which teachers need to carefully guide students to go 
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 The original Chinese texts are “今之教者，呻其占毕，多其讯言….故隐其学而疾其师.” 
 
12
 The original Chinese texts are “虽终其业，其去之必速.” 
 
13
 The original Chinese texts are “道而弗牵则和，强而弗抑则易，开而弗达则思.” 
 
14
 The original Chinese texts are “学学半” and “教然后知困…然后能自强也…教学相长也.” 
 
15





beyond to reach another new level of learning (61).
16
 Furthermore, this Confucian text 
emphasizes that active learning and critical thinking must be integrated, for learning without 
thinking is perplexing while thinking without learning is dangerous (14).
17
 These insightful 
thoughts on heuristic teaching in Confucius are so important in the history of education in China 
that even today they are familiar to most Chinese teachers and thus inspire their teaching. These 
valuable educational suggestions call teachers to seriously respect their students, carefully 
guiding their learning interests according to their personalities, and to regard teaching as an 
interactive process which promotes critical thinking, self-reflection and (re)searching.  
Two primary influences have shifted teaching away from the exemplary 
recommendations based on the teachings of Confucius. The first is that since the Han dynasty 
(202 B.C.-220), Confucianism had been used by the ruling classes in feudal China to govern the 
people as a powerful thought-controlling instrument, especially after the establishment of the 
imperial examination system in 605. This complex but intricate system selected officials into its 
administrative bureaucratic system at different levels not based upon social or political status but 
on their performances in local and national examinations upon serials of Confucian classics.
 
Advertising open competition, fair play, and standardized tests, this examination system held fast 
to the principle that only high-achievers be granted the tickets to bureaucracy.
18
 It can be taken as 
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 The original Chinese texts are “不愤不启，不悱不发.” 
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 The original Chinese texts are “学而不思则罔，思而不学则殆.” 
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 In order to obtain objectivity in evaluation and to avoid possible cheatings in exams, a series of strict rules were 
used such as searching the examinees before entering the exam site, sealing their names on paper, blocking the 
examination site during the exam, and separate evaluation of each answer sheet by three different examiners. Test 
proctors and reexaminations were also employed to make the exams more impartial. Examinations were conducted 
in spare, isolated examination rooms, and sometimes, would be held within cubicles. Candidates were identified by 
number rather than name, and examination answers were recopied by a third person before being evaluated to 




the oldest standardized testing system in the world. The “rags to riches” stories of the winners in 
this examination system imbued the Chinese nation with the idea that “All pursuits are of low 
values; only studying books is high.” The direct result was that almost all middle and upper class 
parents sent their children to study, to memorize all those required classics for the highly 
competitive imperial examinations. The main responsibility of teachers was to tell students the 
“truth” in the Confucian texts, discouraging the student’s own interpretations. Therefore, 
teaching became dominated by the lecturing or telling of the teacher’s narratives.  
The second influence shifting Chinese teaching from Confucian principles is Legalism, a 
philosophical school emerging alongside but in tension with Confucianism. Hua Zhang’s
19
 (2008) 
historical analysis indicates that Legalism fuses education and political control. With this 
amalgamation implemented by the Saint Emperor,
20
 representing all that is right and righteous, 
rules dominate legal and cultural values, educational and social thought. In the eyes of Legalists, 
the Saint Emperor dictates the laws of the world; the people can only follow rather than make 
suggestion or even critique the education he establishes. The effect of the integration of 
education and politics – based purely on the opinion of the Saint Emperor – is a top-down 
hierarchy, the Emperor at the top, dictating autocratically to a population of followers. In this 
sense, the direct aim of teaching or education is to reproduce the current state or hierarchy of the 
society. More specifically, education functions as the handmaiden of politics, providing rigid 
social control as well as stability. 
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 Zhang is not only one of most influential contemporary educational researchers in China, but one of the leading 
figures in the current national curriculum reform in Chinese public schools.  His new book (2008) which sharply 
criticizes the dominant teaching-as-narrating/telling mode in schools has been widely received in China.  
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The marriage of instrumentalized Confucianism, with the invention of the imperial 
examination system, and Legalism, involving grand, totalizing and essentializing narratives, the 
Emperor’s truths, which aimed to control and channel individual minds, laid the ground for 
“teaching-as-narrating” education in today’s China. Zhang remarks that “teaching-as-narrating 
then achieved the highest status in the history of education” so “it is [now] not just a teaching 
method but represents the educational culture of ‘teacher tells and students listen quietly’” (26-
27), reducing learning to “receptive learning” (75). It is interesting to notice that the word of 
“narrating’ (讲授) in “teaching-as-narrating” in Chinese is always constituted by two characters, 
“lecture” (讲) and “offer” (授). It seems to imply that the process of teaching is one in which the 
teacher offers student truth through lecturing. In this sense, Zhang concludes, this “teaching-as-
narrating” tradition in China not only constructs the hierarchy of a human being’s knowing, but 
(re)produces the power dynamics of authority and control. This is a very different sense of 
teaching than the one in “On Learning”.     
 
Modern China, 1902-1948 
Although there were numerous schools across the country through various dynasties in 
ancient China before the 19
th
 century, almost all of them were open only to the middle and upper 
social classes, emphasizing learning classical texts in the humanities. There was no formal 
national schooling system available to all (B. Wang, 2009). The release of the “Royal Law of 
Schooling” (《钦定学堂章程》) in 1902, and “Legislation of Schooling” (《奏定学堂章程》) 
in 1903 led not only to the beginning of compulsory education but also to the establishment of a 




significantly jumped from 719 to 52,348 during 1903-1909 (Shi & Cui, 2009/1999, 5). With the 
mandate to provide public schooling, teaching became a major social concern. Furthermore, the 
abolishment of the imperial examination system in 1905 shifted the narrow focus of education 
from learning for entrance into bureaucracy into a more comprehensive one including both 
sciences and humanities. Both the “Royal Law of Schooling” and “Legislation of Schooling” 
state that “the most important teaching method is narrating”
21
 (C. Wang, 382).  All of these 
events mark the beginning of modern education in China (C. Wang, 2005; B. Wang, 2009).     
This modern beginning in the history of education in China was strongly influenced by 
western pedagogy, especially the works of Johann Amos Comenius (1592-1670) and Johann 
Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841). Their educational works were first popular in Japan and then 
brought to China by overseas Chinese students and scholars in Japan. Specifically, until recent 
years in China, the method and practice of classroom teaching derives from Comenius and also 
from Herbart’s Five Steps.  
In his famous “The Great Didactic” (1896/1632), Comenius ambitiously claims, “We 
venture to promise a GREAT DIDACTIC, that is to say, the whole art of teaching all things to all 
men, and indeed of teaching them with certainty, so that the result cannot fail to follow” (157, 
emphasis original). This “art of teaching all things to all men” is the “art” or technique of class 
teaching: divide a great number of students into classes and each teacher teaches one class using 
the same text books in each subject and the same method of instruction for all subjects; time and 
subjects should be carefully divided and then rigidly adhered to, so all students should do the 
same appointed task at one time. As concluded by Comenius, “In short, as a baker makes a large 
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quantity of bread by a single kneading of the dough and a single heating of the oven, as a brick-
maker burns many bricks at one time, as a printer prints hundreds of thousands of books from the 
same set of type, so should a teacher be able to teach a very large number of pupils at once and 
without the slightest inconvenience” (317).
22
 Zhang (2000) thinks this class teaching method was 
driven by the need of efficiency in modern industrial society and thus he critiques its guarantee 
of no misunderstandings between teacher and student in the transfer of truth along with its 
extreme focus on efficiency and control.   
As Comenius’s method of classroom teaching can make modern schools (re)produce 
students as quickly and efficiently as modern factories, Herbart’s Five Steps of teaching make 
teacher’s teaching as mechanical and uniform as modern workers. Herbart believes that one’s 
reaction to what is offered to sense-perception is always associated with what is already in past 
experience, so instruction must help students assimilate new perceptions through their total 
experience, past and present. Wilhelm Rein, a student of Herbart’s student, Tuiskon Ziller, 
designed a five-step teaching method based upon Herbart’s work:
23
 Preparation (prepare student 
to receive new subject matters); Presentation (present the new subject matters to students); 
Association (connect and compare the new materials to the old ones); Formulation or 
Generalization (illustrate the new materials clearly in great details); Application (apply the new 
subject matters) (Dodd, 1906, 123). Zhang (2008) says since Herbart’s Five Steps were taken by 
his followers as a rigid teaching order to which every teacher must strictly adhere, this teaching 
procedure fell into fundamentalist formalism and was later used by or combined with the 
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 Comenius was a disciple of Peter Ramus. For more on Ramus, see Triche & McKnight (2004).   
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 The original four step teaching method in Herbart includes Clearness (Analysis and Synthesis), Association, 





centralized ideology in the Soviet Union and China.     
The advent of modern schooling in China, especially under the dominant influences of 
Comenius’s uniformed mode of classroom teaching and Herbart’s Five Step teaching method 
(Shi & Cui, 2009/1999; C. Wang, 2005; B. Wang, 2009) perpetuated teaching-as-narrating. In 
1913, the Ministry of Education of People’s China called on all middle schools across the 
country to encourage their teachers to employ narrating as the main teaching method – “Teacher 
narrates and students take notes”
24
 (C. Wang, 382). At that time, teaching-as-narrating was taken 
as the most efficient and easiest way of teaching, and even the only feasible or best way for large 
scale teaching in schools.
25
   
After World War I, the educational theory of progressivism became wide spread in China, 
especially after John Dewey lectured throughout China in 1919-1922. The May Fourth 
Movement
26
 also encouraged the developments of different emerging innovative educational 
theories and practices. As suggested by C. Wang, however, both of these influences had been 
limited in the circle of educational researchers and a small number of “experimental” schools in 
several major cities in China such as Beijing and Shanghai—the mode of teaching-as-
narrating/telling under the overwhelming influence of Comenius and Herbart still dominated in 
most grade schools during that time period (46).  
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 The original Chinese texts are “教员口讲，学生笔记.” 
 
25
The originator of the “one and the best way” to teach was Peter Ramus. See Triche & McKnight (2004).    
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 The May Fourth Movement was a grand intellectual, cultural and political movement in China in the 1920s. Its 
beginning was marked by the student demonstrations in Beijing on May 4th 1919, protesting the compromise the 
government made in the “Treaty of Versailles” after the war in which the province of Shandong was transferred from 
the hands of Germany to Japan. This movement led to a surge of Chinese nationalism and new visions of Chinese 
traditional culture and western democracy and science. In the history of China, its significance is often compared to 




Contemporary China, from 1949 to the Present 
After the communist government of the People’s Republic China was founded in 1949, 
the educational system in China took a sharp turn from learning from the west to learning from 
or copying the Soviet Union. The theoretical works of Soviet educationist, N. A. Kaiipob (1893-
1978), who first constructed a systematic discipline of pedagogy through Marxism, became the 
dominant force in China from the 1950s to the 1980s. His book of “Pedagogy” was the main text 
for students in normal universities and colleges. It is reported that this book sold over 500,000 
copies in China and almost every Grades 1-12 teacher in the city had one in hand in the 1960s; 
moreover, the educational faculty in Beijing Normal University even published a book of 
“Lecture Notes of Pedagogy” in 1956, a well-received book teaching teacher educators how to 
lecture Kaiipob’s book of “Pedagogy” to pre- and in-service teachers (Liu & Lin, 2007). As the 
formal schooling system in China was experiencing explosive expansion during the 1950s and 
1960s, the impact of Kaiipobist pedagogy can be said to be unprecedentedly influential in 
reaching a great number of practicing teachers in Grade 1-12 schools.   
As American teachers worshipped Herbart even more than did German teachers in the 
end of the 19
th
 century, Chinese teachers worshipped Kaiipob even more than did the Soviet 
Union teachers in the 1950s (Shi & Cui, 45). The “Kaiipobist Pedagogy” published in 1951-52 in 
China suggests each class be divided into six time periods based upon Herbart’s Five Steps and 
many schools in China even used six different bell ringings in each class to notify teachers the 
beginning and end of each time period (Zhang, 2008, 95).
27
 As Kaiipob argues in his “Pedagogy” 
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 The six time periods are preparation (1-2 min.), checking students’ homework (3-8 min.), overview of new subject 
matters (5-10 min.), presentation (10-20 min.), association (10 min.) and giving new homework (5-8 min.). Zhang 




book, “Teaching is the teacher’s activity” and “All in-class work and assignments are based upon 
the teacher’s oral presentation of knowledge,” the perspective of the teacher’s “dominant role” in 
classroom is then popularized and even becomes a famous slogan in the educational system in 
China (Yuan, 2003/1998, 62).
28
 This extreme focus on teacher-centeredness deeply entrenched 
the tradition of “teaching-as-narrating” in the daily teaching practices of most, if not all, 
classrooms in China, perhaps accounting for the revered role of teachers in Chinese culture: the 
teacher as the source of all knowledge.  
Now, it is generally acknowledged that the Kaiipobist pedagogy was, in some sense, an 
integration of Herbart’s “narrating” pedagogy with the ideology of the Soviet Union at that time, 
specifically Stalinism. C. Wang (2005) directly says there is a natural flow from the pedagogical 
work of Comenius to Herbart and then to Kaiipob. Zhang (2008) thinks that Chinese educational 
researchers tried hard in looking for the “best,” “generally good” teaching method that could 
“guide” and thus “standardize” all teaching practices and they finally came to believe that it is 
the method of “narrating” that is best (40). He states that the reasons for the predominant 
influence of Kaiipobist pedagogy in China in the past several decades are complex: first, 
politically, it accommodated or satisfied the new government’s ideological propaganda; second, 
culturally, it implicitly echoed the “teaching-as-narrating” tradition of Chinese Legalism or 
legalized Confucianism; third, it was easy for teachers to follow its instructions as a handy 
working manual (123). There is a danger that teaching-as-narrating/telling can and does 
                                                                                                                                                             
routine of 45 minutes per class in daily classrooms in China until now.  
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 The absolute control by the teacher was legitimized in the Soviet Union in its “Decision of the Syllabus and 
Teaching Practice in Elementary and Middle Schools” in 1932: “The Party requires that the absolute leading role of 
teachers must be guaranteed in all schools…. Teachers must systematically and coherently narrate all subject 





sometimes function as a tool of political propaganda in promoting a particular political ideology.  
Furthermore, Zhang says both Kaiipobist pedagogy and the “teaching-as-
narrating/telling” tradition in China emphasize the “educational rule”: “Teaching must be 
Educative” (97). This educative aspect of teaching is different from the meaning of “educative” 
in Dewey’s “educative experience,” for it implies the shaping of students’ minds through 
teachers’ telling, not through students’ doings. Zhang thinks one hidden reason why the Chinese 
government hesitates to limit class size legislatively might be that the bigger the class is, the 
easier is for the teacher to establish his/her absolute authority and thus to put all students under 
control and mold their minds (94). In this sense, the problematic of the “teaching-as-narrating” 
tradition in China is not the employment of it as an educational method as much as it is the 
implicit control of channeling students’ thoughts and perspectives toward a particular ideology.
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The following quotation describes well the teaching practice of narrating/telling now, in Chinese 
schools:   
Day in and day out, 12 million teachers are teaching the 220 million students in 
the same way in China – telling students the truth from textbooks. In this 
schooling system, every student spends 9 or 12 years in this receptive learning 
and intense training of knowledge and skills. This is the portrait of current 
teaching reality in China. (Zhang, 2008, 8) 
 
Currently, the average time of “teachers’ narrating, i.e. teachers’ telling from above not talking 
with students” occupies over 65% in Grade 1-12 classrooms in China (Shi & Cui, 2009/1999, 
175, emphasis original). C. Wang argues this determines the main learning way of students: 
passively listening to the teacher’s narrating and telling. The implicit rule of “teacher teaches 
first and then students learn” can be interpreted as “the teacher narrates first and then students 
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listen” (C. Wang, 2005, 378). The separation in time, the “first/then” relationship, seems to 
suggest that students’ learning depends completely on the teacher’s teaching as the telling of 
truth. As this dominance of teaching upon learning implies that “no teaching, no learning,” it 
seems to forget that in the very beginning of history of education in China, “teaching” originated 
from “learning,” both linguistically and conceptually.   
Zhang (2008) explains that in this frame it is assumed the teaching-listening relation 
cannot generate new knowledge, it can only function to efficiently transfer “the products of 
knowledge” (6). The essence of a teacher’s “teaching” is to transfer knowledge others have 
produced while student’s “learning” is to acquire approved knowledge. He says this “give-and-
receive” relationship between teacher and student has been written into official textbooks for 
teacher education released by the Ministry of Education, and then widely read by millions of pre- 
and in-service teachers, thus significantly influencing teaching practices in China.     
From the 1980s, after the end of the “Cultural Revolution,” Chinese educational 
researchers began to critically reflect on the path of learning along which China had walked (C. 
Wang, 2005; B. Wang, 2009; Zhang, 2008). Since the national curriculum reform started in 2001 
in China, more and more attention is shifting from teachers’ teaching to students’ learning to 
nurture students’ creativity and imagination (Zhu, 2006). Many researchers in education have 
been aware of and critiqued the limitations of the “teaching-as-narrating/telling” method, 
currently dominant and still entrenched as a teaching method in most Chinese classrooms, 
although it is still regarded as the most important teaching method in almost all official texts in 
normal universities and colleges. While acknowledging the dangers of this method, researchers 
insist this is not only the oldest and easiest but most efficient, practical and thus widely applied 




to better this teaching method by paying more attention to students’ learning; however, in reality, 
their attempts continue to justify teaching-as-narrating/telling – but recommend doing it better.   
In “Theories of Curriculum and Instruction” edited by B. Wang (2009), also entitled as 
the “National Textbook for Elementary Education Majors in Higher Education Institutions,” 
Yuanhui Zhe and Xinmin Pan claim that “the first and most important thing in the method of 
teaching-as-narrating is that the teacher must guarantee the rightness of what s/he is teaching – 
every concept and sentence from the teacher’s mouth must be right” (200). As this is the 
textbook for future elementary school teachers, they also emphasize that “because elementary 
school students have relatively poor experience, logical thinking and judgmental ability, the 
teacher should not teach any controversial issues to them” (200). Both above arguments touch on 
the essence of the method of “teaching-as-narrating/telling”: the mechanical transferring of 
knowledge/truth from teacher to student in an authoritative top-down relationship. This reminds 
me of a frequently used phrase or metaphor in Chinese educational literature to describe the act 
of teaching as “force feeding ducks,” where students are taught in schools like ducks on the farm, 
forced to swallow what is forced upon them.  
 
Conclusion 
When I attended an international conference of education several months ago in Shanghai, 
I found an interesting phenomena: while American educational researchers criticize the 
schooling system in their country and look to Chinese schools for hopes, their colleagues in 
China are idealizing the education in America for possible solutions to the problematics in 
Chinese education. As I look back to my educational experience, as both teacher and student in 




persistently haunts schools not only in the United States but also in China, past and present. This 
control extends to teachers and students alike, for I felt it in the classrooms when my former 
educational professor claimed the foremost responsibility of teachers was to “teach truth” to 
“enlighten” students;  I felt it again when I read the stated objectives of knowledge/truth Tracy’s 
teacher was determined to teach. Reflecting on the Concise Oxford Dictionary definitions of 
truth and knowledge, I feel compelled to question a tension between truth received from others 
and the truth that is called knowledge derived from experience. For me this difference calls to 
question the nature of truth as the opposite of false, a point that Dewey and Parker Palmer make 
in talking about either/or’s. 
This chapter reviewed selected literature critical of teaching-as-telling and of learning-as-
being-told in the United States and three major historical influences on teaching that led to the 
development of teaching-as-narrating, the dominant mode of teaching, in China. Both show that 
this traditional direct teaching of truth is entrenched in the public school systems in America and 
China as not only a teaching method but an implicit educational culture. Teaching is thus merely 
a method to instruct students to gain accepted knowledge or truth. One of the major changes in 
current teacher education programs in China is the proliferation of “method” courses such as 
“math methods” and “English methods.” Teaching seems to become more and more a “craft” or 
“technique” rather than an “art.”  
Martin Heidegger (1971/1959) provides a sharp critique of “method”: “The sciences 
know the way to knowledge by the term ‘method.’ Method, especially in today’s modern 
scientific thought, is not a mere instrument serving the sciences; rather, it has pressed the 
sciences into its own service” (74). If as Heidegger says, quoting Nietzsche, there has been a 




ways of being, then I suggest analogously that teaching as narrating/telling has achieved a 
victory over education and learning. In other words, teaching becomes strategies and skills while 
forgetting its essence as being. About the being of teaching I say more in chapters three and four. 
Can learning, as study, as exploration be restored to the prominence it once had? In 
ancient China? In ancient Greece? Is there another method for teaching besides teaching as 
narrating/telling? As I have been struggling with these questions, the works of Martin Heidegger 
help me greatly, especially his phenomenological perspectives on truth and untruth. In the next 
chapter, I will focus on Heidegger’s conceptualizations of teaching and learning, especially his 
explorations of (un)truth and clearing as unconcealment.   
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Chapter Three
Heidegger’s Concept of Teaching
Why Does Heidegger Interest Me?
Once a whole world listened to him.
-- Bernhard Welte, 1981/1976, 73
The above quotation is from the beginning of Berhard Welte’s speech at Heidegger’s
burial in 1976. As one of the most influential contemporary philosophers, Heidegger (1889-1976)
is the major founder of phenomenology after Edmund Husserl, and his critique of modernity, in
some sense, opens the door of post-modern thought. His masterpiece, “Being and Time” in 1927,
is one of the most original and influential works in the 20th century’s philosophy. Heidegger’s
phenomenological work has also had great impact on contemporary philosophical movements
such as existentialism, hermeneutics, deconstructionism, and post-structuralism. According to
Welte, since Heidegger comes from the earth of Messkirch, “his thought has shaken the world
and the century” (73).
Thomas Sheehan (1981) has a pithy summary of Heidegger: his thought is “complex but
simple,” while his life is “simple but complex” (v). It can be said that, in this complexity, the
primary or even the only topic of Heidegger’s thinking, is “Being.” 1 Sheehan states that Aristotle,
on whom Heidegger draws extensively, argues overall the defining question of First Philosophy
is “What is being-ness of beings?” This “essence” or “X-ness” is not something objective, but
“the meaningful relatedness, the intelligible presentness, of things to and for man” (x). It is this
1 Sheehan says this life-long research focus for Heidegger changes throughout his career – from the question of “the
meaning of Being” to “the truth of Being” and then “the place of Being” (vii, emphasis original).
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disclosive relation between man and beingness that Heidegger tries to retrieve from the ancient
Greek philosophy and presses him to ask the phenomenological question, “What is the Being of
beingness?” In asking this question, Heidegger wishes to move beyond the traditional
philosophical question, “What is the essence of beings?” to ask, “What is the essence of
essence?”  In the very beginning of his “Being and Time,” Heidegger (1962/1927) tackles this
“darkest” question of “Being” and says we have to face this question despite its indefinability.
Since Being is not an entity, he says, “Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it,
choosing, access to it – all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore
are modes of Being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves” (26-27).
Here Being is neither something “out there” as traditional beingness of beings to be discovered
nor creations of humans; rather, it is the presence or happening of the world opened by the
inquirers as ourselves. In this sense, Heidegger argues Being is the unconcealment of truth in his
phenomenological work.
As Heidegger (1992/1925) argues that the essence of phenomenological investigations is
that “they cannot be reviewed summarily but must in each case be rehearsed and repeated anew”
(p. 26), he spends his whole life in this “work of laying open and letting be seen” (86, emphasis
original). According to him, “Any further synopsis which merely summarizes the contents of this
work would thus be, phenomenologically speaking, a misunderstanding” (26). Furthermore,
Heidegger explains the word of “investigation” which means not to “simply pull out results and
integrate them into a system” but “to implicate the reader into pressing further and working
through the matters under investigations” (26). All of these beautiful and powerful accounts of
phenomenology really strike me.
This Heideggerian sense of “phenomenological investigation” is what I am looking
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forward to in my search for alternatives to traditional didactic teaching. Although this teaching as
“telling and being told” has already been reviewed, critiqued and given suggestions of change by
a great number of educational scholars, I investigate this issue again not to just “pull out results
and integrate them into a system” but to get anew this question through bridging western
phenomenology and the eastern philosophy of Chinese Taoism. Specifically, I am looking for the
not-yet possibilities of alternative ways and perspectives of teaching through the resonance
among (1) Heidegger’s struggle between truth and untruth, (2) Lao Tzu’s conceptualization and
practice of inaction, and (3) Dewey’s critique of traditional direct teaching.
I realize that many curriculum scholars do not wrestle with truth, certainly not in its
purity, and do not see the teacher’s role as the authoritative transmitter of truth. So why do I go
back to truth and untruth in Heidegger? First of all, although Heidegger has not produced major
writings specifically in teaching and learning, his assertion that questioning functions as “the
piety of thought” contributes to our understanding of teaching. In “A Letter to A Young Student”
(1971/1950), he states, “I can provide no credentials for what I have said – which, indeed, you do
not ask of me – that would permit a convenient check in each case whether what I say agrees
with ‘reality’” (186). Therefore, instead of trying to provide any big “convenient check” as
established truth corresponding to the “reality,” Heidegger only offers small “changes” that can
be inserted into the fixed system to turn or expose it inside out, to critically examine what has
been covered up before. Using these small changes to challenge big checks, Heidegger tries to
compel us “to think, to question what we ‘normally’ do not question” by “his strange use of
familiar words, his seemingly perverse etymologies, his deceptively simple gnomic sentences,
his repetitions and staccato rhythms” in “dis-rupt[ing] and dis-turb[ing] ‘normal’ argumentative
philosophic discourse” (Berstein, 1992, 93-94).
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Another reason that Heidegger interests me is that he establishes an essential unity
between (un)truth and education. In his lecture, Plato’s Doctrine of Truth (1998/1931, 32),2
Heidegger traces the significant change of the essence of truth in Plato’s cave allegory. This
change affected the history of Western thinking, including its concept of education. For
Heidegger, “the essence of ‘education’ is grounded in the essence of ‘truth’” (170). The
exploration of this original and profound sense of truth sheds light on that of education,
especially teaching.
Heidegger’s exploration of truth and untruth goes beyond binary opposition reaching
deeper into the complex dynamics between these two, especially shown in his radical statement,
“in essence, truth is untruth” (1993/1936, 179). In other words, it is not merely that “mistakes
can also be good for we can learn from them,” or “failure is the mother of success”; rather,
Heidegger goes further to argue that untruth can never be equated with so called mistakes or
errors while he tries to revive a more fundamental, primordial sense of truth rather than truth as
merely “correctness.” He (1971/1950) asserts, “Everything here is the path of responding that
examines as it listens. Any path always risks going astray, leading astray… Stay on the path, in
genuine need, and learn the craft of thinking, unswerving, yet erring” (186). This intricate quote
from Heidegger implies the potential dangers as the seemingly absolute objective truth is shaken
by untruth. The following brief introduction of Heidegger’s personal life history might help in
understand his philosophical ideas in a more situated way.
2 This is a gift Heidegger dedicates to his father’s 80th birthday (2008, Letters to His Wife, 135).  Heidegger’s
Letters to His Wife is written in the years from 1915-1970, collected in a book by his granddaughter, Gertrud
Heidegger, issued in 2008.
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Heidegger’s Personal Life History
As one of the most thought-provoking thinkers and philosophers in the 20th century,
Heidegger’s career and life are marked with many controversies and rumors, compliments and
critiques. One reason for this Heidegger myth is that he did not like biographers. There is a well-
known story about Heidegger’s introduction of Aristotle in a lecture: “He was born, he worked,
he died.”  I hope the following narratives of his life history will not oversimplify the perplexities
of his life.3
Martin Heidegger was born on the 26th of September 1889, as the son of a master cooper
and sexton in Messkirch, Germany. In 1903, he left the local citizens’ school to attend the
humanist grammar school and the Catholic seminary in Constance. 4 He went to the Berthold
Gymnasium in Freiburg in 1906 receiving a scholarship. Heidegger (1981) recalls in his “A
Recollection” that between 1903 and 1909, he enjoyed “fruitful learning under excellent teachers
of the Greek, Latin, and German languages” and acquired “everything that was to be of lasting
value” (21). In 1907 he received a 220-page treatise, “On the Several Senses of Being in
Aristotle” by Franz Brentano in 1862, from his fatherly friend, Father Grober. He said this text
helplessly stirred in him the quest for the meaning of Being which remained “through many
upsets, wanderings, and perplexities, the ceaseless impetus for the treatise Being and Time which
appeared two decades later” (1981, 21, emphasis original). Financially supported by the Church,
3 Personally, I find these perplexities bothersome:  not only questions of his anti-Semitism, but also his treatment of
women, friends and teacher.
4 Heidegger (2008) described himself in his childhood as “a simple boy, living with modest, pious people in the
country; … who savoured all the wonderful poetry open to a sexton’s son, lay for hours up in the church tower &
gazed after the swifts & dreamt his way over the dark pine forests; who rummaged about in the dusty old books in
the church loft & felt like a king among the piles of books which he did not understand but every one of which he
knew & reverentially loved” (5).
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Heidegger began to study Catholic theology5 and philosophy in Freiburg in 1909. As his parents
hoped for a priest, he chose to become a philosopher and left the seminary in 1911.6 But he
continued his studies and received a doctoral degree in 1913, and then taught at Freiburg
University on transcendental philosophy in 1915-16. Heidegger said, this teaching position
meant to him “much, much more than an office, a position within society, a career” for it was “a
priesthood, something to which only the ‘ordained’ may gain entry” (2008, 6).
Heidegger began to read Edmund Husserl’s “Logical Investigations” from the first
semester at the university especially when he knew Husserl was a student of Brentano and
expected to get help from him on the question of Being evoked by Brentano’s dissertation.
Heidegger described his meeting with Husserl in 1917 as “one episode in a process that comes to
me largely out of the darkness & leads on into the darkness” as he tried to climb his own
philosophical mountain (2008, 33). Sheehan (1981) says in reading the “transcendental” Husserl
in “Ideas” and the “realist” Husserl in “Logical Investigations,” Heidegger realized that he
needed to go beyond Husserl, to develop his own phenomenological way. In one letter to his wife
in 1919, Heidegger wrote, “I’m already certainly beyond him [Husserl] & with much broader
horizons & problems” (2008, 62). In 1920, Heidegger became the private assistant of Edmund
Husserl in Freiburg. This collaborative relationship brought Heidegger out as Husserl’s favorite
student and colleague. In the 1920s, Husserl even said to Heidegger, “You and I are
5 Born into a Catholic family, Heidegger was raised up through “an ultra-Catholic education,” but after he grew up
he began to complain the “Catholic system’s inner lack of freedom,” especially after he married his protestant wife,
Elfride Petri, in 1917 (2008, 50). Later, he even claimed that “I’m ‘officially’ Catholic, I’m inwardly Protestant”
(114).
6 Heidegger (2008) said at that time he struggled to “win the right to live purely on knowledge, to make his mother
believe that the philosopher too can achieve great things for men & their eternal happiness – how often did she ask
her son, ‘what is philosophy, do tell me,’ & he couldn’t give an answer himself” (5).
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phenomenology” (quoted in Sheehan, 7). In 1927, Heidegger’s masterpiece, “Being and Time”
(Sein und Zeit) was published in Husserl’s “Annual for Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research.” Husserl recommended Heidegger to be his successor in the chair of philosophy in
Freiburg in 1928. In the same year, Heidegger wrote “On the Essence of Ground” as a
contribution to honor Husserl on his 70th birthday. 7
In April of 1933, Heidegger was elected as rector of Freiburg University. In May, both
Heidegger and his wife8 joined the National Socialist party. Although Heidegger resigned in
February 1934, the hectic ten month rectorship became the target sharply critiqued by his
opponents. Apparently in the 1930s Heidegger had deep faith in Hitler and his National Socialist
party to renew the forces and lead the future of not just Germany but the West. 9 What is seen as
more unforgivable in Heidegger is his silence on the horrible crimes of the Nazis and holocaust
after 1945. After the war, Heidegger was banned from teaching from 1946 until 1950. After the
1940s, he became strongly focused on his philosophical thinking and been allowed to teach.
Then he offered seminars and lectures not only in Germany but in both Europe and North
America. During this time period, both language and the essence of modern technology were
among his primary topics of research. On 26th May 1976, Heidegger died at home.
7 Regarding his later break with Husserl in the 1930s, Heidegger (1981) says in the Spiegel interview, that he does
not know what led Husserl to oppose his thought in public and denies there is anything of this related to Husserl
being Jewish. He also clarifies two rumors: he never forbade Husserl’s use of the university library and his
dedication to Husserl in the fifth edition of “Being and Time” was taken off under pressure from the publisher.
8 Throughout her whole life, Elfride never changes her nationalistic and anti-Semitic perspectives.
9 In his inaugural speech of “The Self-Assertion of the German Universities,” Heidegger (1965/1933) directly claims
that “The Fuhrer himself, and only he, is the current and future reality of Germany, and his word is your law” (28).
Later in his address at the election meeting of German Scholars in Leipzig, Heidegger (1965/1933) states again that
“The National Socialist Revolution is not simply the taking of power in the state by one party from another, but
brings a complete revolution of our German existence” (32).
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Complexities and Contradictions of Heidegger’s Associations with Nazis
Not until 1966 when Heidegger was interviewed by the German news weekly, Der
Spiegel, did he finally give a detailed explanation on his 1933-34 period. This interview was later
published five days after his death in 1976, as he requested it not be published while he was alive.
In the Spiegel interview, Heidegger (1981/1966) said before his rectorate, he was “in no way
politically active” (46). He recalled that in April 1933, the ex-rector von Mollendorf, on the day
of his dismissal for forbidding anti-Jewish posters in the university, said, “Heidegger, now you
must take over the rectorate” (46). Besides von Mollendorf, many of his young colleagues also
urged him to apply for the position in the interest of the university. As for what he said of the
“Fuhrer,” Heidegger explained that after he took over the rectorate he’s clear that he “would not
survive without compromises” (49). He said, he forbade the notorious book-burning in the
university and tried to protect his Jewish colleagues such as professor Thannhauser and von
Hevesy and students such as Helene Weiss. He felt sad that not a word was commented on his
resignation as there were so many on his assumption of the rectorate. After the resignation,
Heidegger said he completely focused on his own teaching. His successor at that time of
resignation was announced as “The First National Socialist Rector of the University.” Heidegger
reported that then not only was he watched by the party, but his publications were not allowed to
even be reviewed. In 1944, as 500 scientists and artists were freed of any war service, Heidegger
was put in the “completely expendable” faculty group by the rector and called up to build
fortifications (54).
When I read through the numerous critiques and analyses of Heidegger’s complicit
relation with the Nazis, two of most impressive ones to me are Emmanuel Levinas and Richard
Bernstein. Levinas (1998) thinks Heidegger’s ontology of understanding Being consists in
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“going beyond [particular] being… and perceiving it upon the horizon of being,” and thus
Heidegger “rejoins the great tradition of Western philosophy: to understand particular being is
already to place oneself beyond the particular” (5, emphasis original). He sees Heidegger
continuing Western philosophy’s primacy of the Same over the Other. For Levinas, the Other lies
in the heart of his ethics. Furthermore, Levinas argues our relation with the Other exceeds the
confines of understanding. For Levinas, there is no preexisting horizon in our encounter with the
Other as in Heidegger’s ontology. In other words, Levinas thinks the Other defies any rational
appropriation in ontology. Therefore, he critiques that Heidegger’s focus on ontology at the
expense of ethics allows him to cooperate with the Nazis and be silent regarding their atrocities.
Bernstein (1992) reports that there is a missing passage in Heidegger’s manuscript of
“The Question Concerning Technology” from the published text: “Agriculture is now motorized
food industry – in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and
extermination camps, the same as blockading and starving of nations, then as the manufacture of
hydrogen bombs” (130). Bernstein then questions whether “in essence” there is no significant
difference between motorized agriculture and the genocide of Jews. Bernstein quotes Habermas
that “Under the leveling gaze of the philosopher of Being even the extermination of Jews seems
merely an event equivalent to many others. Annihilations of Jews, expulsion of Germans – they
amount to the same” (133). Bernstein thinks the real danger of Heidegger’s thinking is that it
“anesthetizes us to the frightful contingencies of human life and death” (133, emphasis original)
– it only concerns the “response to the silent call of Being, not to the silent screams of our fellow
human beings” (134). This, in some sense, echoes Levinas’s critique of Heidegger’s ontology.
Concerning the critiques from Levinas and Berstein on Heidegger’s philosophy,
especially his ontology, I think both of them are right that it is this slippery sense of ethics in
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Heidegger’s thoughts that leads to his association with Nazis and his being unable to confront
their horrible crimes. The following texts from his letter to his wife in March 1933, just before he
became the rector and joined the party, might help with an understanding of his later decisions.
Heidegger (2008) wrote in the letter, “I mustn’t allow a type of action that is ‘political’ in the
narrow sense somehow to become the yardstick for philosophical action … Precisely in this
respect Jas [Karl Jaspers] 10 thinks too much in terms of ‘humanity’” (142). Here his contempt of
the “humanity” in Jaspers seems to suggest his later silence to the terrible crimes committed by
the Nazis to the Jews. I suggest that part of this silence or mistake of Heidegger comes from his
own misjudgment or untruth, not completely from his philosophy. As an extremely original
thinker and philosopher, Heidegger was actually not politically “active” except for that short-
term rectorate. Throughout his whole life, Heidegger took philosophical thinking as the first
priority. That he saw them as separate led to many critiques.
In his “Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?” published only one month after his resignation
in 1934, Heidegger said after he left Freiburg and withdrew to his cabin, he enjoyed the solitude
in the country as the world of the city ran “the risk of falling into a destructive error” (1981, 29).
After his ban on teaching was removed in 1950, he wrote to his wife that he would only maintain
a loose connection to the university and “for the rest to stay entirely away from everything; for
otherwise I’ll always be used for something or other in some way or other, & substantive
interests & tasks will no longer carry any weight at all” (2008, 216). This “apolitical” turn in
Heidegger especially after his rectorship shows that he regretted being used in politics. As
Heidegger (2008) realizes, “much untruth is involved” in his own life (254), he thinks this erring
10 A German philosopher who was banned from teaching and publication during the war as his wife was Jewish.
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accompanied his searching for truth on the path of his thinking. This does not mean his erring
can be excused, but as he argues, in the complex relationship between truth and untruth, great
thinkers also err greatly.
Heidegger’s “Let Learn” through “Always-Being-in-the-World”
Before exploring Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective on truth, I will explore his
thoughts on teaching and learning, specifically his concept of “let learn” through “always-being-
in-the-world.” “What Calls for Thinking” (1993/1951-52) is one of the few of Heidegger’s works
focusing on teaching and learning. In it, Heidegger claims that the role of teaching is being in
relation with the world. What can be learned are not chunks of knowledge or information that
can be added to our previous knowing; rather what can be learned is our being related to the
world in which we live. For Heidegger (1992/1925), “knowing is always a mode of being of
Dasein on the basis of its already being involved with the world” (161). Here, two of the most
important key words in Heidegger’s theoretical framework appear, “Dasein” and “world.”
According to Heidegger, Dasein is human being, not as subject, but as openness to the world in
which beings can disclose themselves. In other words, both being and Dasein are verbs, not
nouns. Dasein does not reveal or describe the hidden essence of being but is the complex of
defining relations and potentials of being. Furthermore, he explains that “Dasein is the entity
which I myself am in each instance, in whose being I as an entity ‘have an interest’ or share, an
entity which is in each instance to be it in my own way” (152-153, emphasis original). In this
sense, Dasein is constituted by its ways to be in each particular moment. Heidegger has a
wonderful metaphor to describe the complex relation between Dasein and world in which he
compares Dasein to a snail in its shell.
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Its [the snail’s] act of crawling out is but a local modification of its already-being-
in-the-world. Even when it is in its shell, its being is being-outside, rightly
understood. It is not in its shell like water in the glass, for it has the inside of its
shell as a world which it pushes against and touches, in which it wars itself, and
the like… The snail is not at the outset only in its shell and not yet in the world, a
world described as standing over against it, an opposition which it broaches by
first crawling out. It crawls out only insofar as its being is already to be in a world.
It does not first add a world to itself by touching. Rather, it touches because its
being means nothing other than to be in a world. (166)
In this sense, as suggested by Heidegger, Dasein is not self-contained but “rather absorbed in
dealing with the matters at hand concretely and practically” (30). It is in this absorption that
Dasein uncovers the world and at the same time this active involvement of Dasein is often
forgotten by people. As the “self-containment expressed in Descartes’s postulate ego cogito ergo
sum asserts both the primacy of the transcendental ego as absolute consciousness intact from the
taint of involvement with external objects and existence as prior to all such involvement,”
Heidegger (2002/1945) claims that Dasein shows its fundamental condition of being absorbed in
the world and “its concern with the here and now” (34). In brief, Heidegger thinks “Dasein is to
show itself as being-in-the-world” (156). This “being-in-the-world” is, in essence, “being-
with(in)-the-world.” Besides, Heidegger (1998/1928) points out “World never is, but worlds”
(126, emphasis original).
Since the world is never a non-changing object standing against us, this being-in-the-
world is actually being-in-relation – being involved, engaged, “lingering with and letting oneself
be affected” (Heidegger, 1992/1925, 159). This awareness of being-in-the-world or being-in-
relation is important in teaching and learning. By raising the example of the teaching of a
cabinetmaker to his apprentice, Heidegger argues that the learning of the apprentice does not
merely lie in practicing the use of tools or gaining knowledge of the forms of things he will build,
but responding to the different kinds of wood “as it enters into man’s dwelling with all the
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hidden riches of its essence” because “this relatedness to wood is what maintains the whole
craft” or “the craft will never be anything but empty busywork, any occupation with it will be
determined exclusively by business concerns” (379). In other words, unless one can develop this
intimate relation to what one learns, one can hardly get into genuine learning. Using the words of
my high school teacher on poetry, the aim of teaching poetry is not to make students write
beautiful lines but to let them know a poetic way of living in this world. As Heidegger
(1993/1936) argues, “Teaching is a giving, an offering; but what is offered in teaching is not the
learnable” (275); teaching, in some sense, is to give or offer students more ways of relating to the
world they live in.
This being-in-relation does not only mean the relation between the act and content of
teaching or learning but also the relation between teaching and learning. While Heidegger
(1993/1951-52) states “what teaching calls for is this: to let learn” (379-380), he (1993/1936)
says,
Teaching therefore does not mean anything else than to let the others learn, that is,
to bring one another to learning. Teaching is more difficult than learning; for only
he who can truly learn – and only as long as he can do it – can truly teach... In all
teaching the teacher learns the most. (275-276)
In this sense, teaching is not the determination of learning but letting learning happen – the
teacher is not the dictator but helper or facilitator of his students. This is why Heidegger
(1993/1951-52) writes that “The teacher must be capable of being more teachable than the
apprentices” (380). While the teacher learns through teaching, students also can teach through
learning. This is quite different from the traditional logic of “the teacher teaches and then
students learn.” Next I introduce his conceptualizations of truth and untruth through which
traditional direct teaching can be questioned.
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What Is Truth?
Is truth merely the empty sophistry of a conceptual game, or is it an abyss?
–Heidegger, 1993/1936, 176
“What is truth” is a difficult but important question for all philosophers, and Heidegger is
no exception. In the lecture “On the Essence of Truth,” Heidegger (1998/1930) first traces the
traditional concepts of truth, including material truth and propositional truth. The former truth is
the “consonance [Einstimmigkeit] of a matter with what is supposed in advance regarding it,”
and the latter is the “accordance of what is meant in the statement with the matter” (138). For
example, if a nugget of gold conforms to our definition of genuine gold, “this is genuine gold” is
a material truth. On the other hand, if our statement “this is genuine gold” conforms to the
standard of genuine gold, this statement is a propositional truth. So, Heidegger summarizes that
traditional truth is the “correspondence [Angleichung] of the matter to knowledge” or
“knowledge to the matter” – truth as “a conforming to … [Sichrichtennach…]” or “correctness
[Richtigkeit]” (138). In this sense, truth can be taken as correct or true “knowledge.” He then
points out that this definition of truth needs no further proof than a self-sufficient reason.
Interesting questions revolve around issues of “untruth” as either incorrectness or
nonaccordance outside the essence of truth. It is from the assumption of propositional truth as
correctness of representation and from untruth as the non-essence of truth that Heidegger begins
to dis-rupt the traditional concept of truth – “truth is not so much a property of knowing but is
rather a character of the being of Dasein itself” (1992/1925, 167, emphasis original). For
Heidegger, the essence of Being is not the concealed core of being as a noun, but is tied up in the
act of be-ing as a verb. Gregory Fried (2000) points out that, truth, according to Heidegger, is
more of “an ongoing happening in which Dasein is free for its possibilities” (50, emphasis
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original). This, however, does not mean that truth is of our making or handiwork: “we could not
even presuppose that there already is manifest something to which we can conform ourselves,
unless the unconcealment of beings had already exposed us to, placed us in that cleared realm in
which every being stands for us and from which it withdraws” (Heidegger, 1993/1936, 177). In
this sense, truth is engagement with, and discloser of, being. As Dasein lets beings be, Heidegger
warns, it can also let them not be themselves.
Untruth: Opposite of Truth or Another Profound Truth?
The opposite of a true statement is a false statement, but the opposite of a profound truth
can be another profound truth.
--Niels Bohr, in Palmer, 1998, 194
In Heidegger’s (1993/1936) phenomenological perspective of truth, untruth is not simply
the opposite of truth, but “the reservoir of the not-yet-revealed, the un-uncovered, in the sense of
concealment” (185). There is a critical turn in Heidegger’s thoughts on truth: in his early
discourse on truth, especially in “Being and Time,” truth is taken as the unconcealment of Being;
but in his later works such as “On the Essence of Truth,” it is “haunted by a sub-discourse on
untruth” (Sallis, 1999, 29). Sallis points out in Heidegger’s later discourse on truth, untruth not
only belongs to truth but is older than truth which means “an ordering that would exceed all the
words by which it has been named in the history of metaphysics” (29). Untruth as this excess and
“reserve of concealment…. withholds the essence of truth from the demand for self-showing”
(29). In this sense, untruth cannot be easily equated with so called mistakes or errors that have to
be corrected. On the contrary, untruth coexists with truth so intimately that there is always some
concealment of untruth in the seemingly unshakeable truth and vice versa. Heidegger (1998/1930)
explains, “If the essence of truth is not exhausted by the correctness of statement, then neither
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can untruth be equated with the incorrectness of judgments” (147). More radically, Heidegger
(1993/1936) claims: “In essence, truth is untruth,” because
the essence of truth, that is, of unconcealment, is dominated throughout by a
denial. Yet this denial is not an effect or a fault, as though truth were an unalloyed
unconcealment that has rid itself of everything concealed. If truth could
accomplish this, it would no longer be itself. This denial, in the form of a double
concealment, belongs to the essence of truth as unconcealment. Truth, in its
essence, is un-truth. (179)
This statement of truth as untruth is quite different from our common assumption of truth as what
is right and untruth what is wrong. Heidegger here announces the impossibility of ultimate truth,
“an unalloyed unconcealment that has rid itself of everything concealed.” In other words, as the
denial of truth, untruth mixes with truth inseparably. This directly challenges the role of the
teacher: what can be taught and learned in our classrooms besides the nonexistent pure truth? If
we cannot teach our students directly what is right and wrong as truth and falsity, what will be
the point of our teaching, or how can we deal with the untruth in our teaching? Thus, the
necessity of en-teaching emerges. En-teaching requires us as teachers not to directly transfer or
force any absolute truth to or upon students for right answers. But it does not mean non-teaching.
It teaches by undoing, clearing, caring and conversing to help not only students but teachers to
see truth through the lens of untruth and untruth through the lens of truth.
If truth, as Descartes asserts, is built up, layer by layer, from the foundation of the
thinking subject (and “subject” itself means ground), truth as un-truth or un-truth as truth in
Heidegger has surpassed the established fixed boundary of truth as correspondence into an
ongoing path of truth as becoming and happening as advent. 11 In this sense, to teach is not
11 Heidegger (1993/1936) thinks, “The critical concepts of truth which, since Descartes, start out from truth as
certainty, are merely variations of the definition of truth as correctness” (177).
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merely to teach or transfer preestablished truth. This reminds me of a recent discussion I had in
my elementary teacher education class. When we discussed whether ethics could be taught to
students, one student raised the issue that we can do that by telling our students directly what is
right and wrong. Then I shared with them a story I observed in a fourth grade reading class in the
United States. In that reading class, the teacher and students read a story together as was
common practice. The story took place in a Japan zoo, where the staff had to make the difficult
decision as to who would euthanize two elephants before the World War II bombing of the city in
case the elephants broke loose in a stampede. The details of the struggle of both the staff in
making the hard decision and the elephants, which tried every means to escape and finally died
with tears, were so touching to the class that most of the students could not help stopping their
tears at the death of the elephants. One little girl sobbed, “Oh, how evil those bomb droppers are!
I hate them! If it were not for them, the elephants would not need to die!”
In fact, that story happened in Japan before the end of World War II. At that time, I found
I could not keep silent as a Chinese visitor who knows that period of history. I raised my hand
and the teacher nicely gave me time and a chance to speak about the historical context of that
story, in which almost one third of the families in China lost some dear family members in the
1937 invasion by Japan and how Japan refused to end the war in 1945. I tried my best to tell all
this in a way understandable to those students. That is one of the classes I will never forget: we
expressed our sympathy for not only the elephants and people in Japan, but also for the victims
in China; we discussed whether bombing was the best way to force Japan to end the war, what
we could do if we were hurt by the other, whether violence is the right response to oppose
violence. We touched on many issues in our discussions which went far beyond the question of
the right or wrong of putting the elephants to death.
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As I related this discussion to my elementary teacher education students, we asked, “Did
my interjection go too far for students of such a young age? Should we, as teachers, tell students
clearly the seemingly black and white on ethical issues? Are there any basics of ethics for people
to follow in our society which we should establish in the minds of our students first?” As in the
discussion with the fourth graders, I listened carefully to the hot debates which went on during
most of the class with my elementary teacher education students. Even after class, some students
came to me, “Jie, I still think I cannot agree with that point in our discussion.” Actually I do not
have the so called right answers to all those meaningful but difficult questions: I do not have that
absolute truth to teach them what they should do in those occasions. But one thing I am sure of is
that, although we did not reach a final conclusion, we all learned from the discussions. It is in
this constantly honing process between truth and untruth that genuine learning occurs – “He who
thinks greatly must err greatly” (Heidegger, 1971/1947, 9). This naturally brings us back to
Heidegger’s own “errings.” When Heidegger is not welcomed at the University and banned from
teaching in 1946, one of the most difficult time periods for him, he writes to his wife that,
You ask about the meaning of the final stanza of ‘The Daily Work of Thinking’:
‘err uncommonly’ – the ‘uncommonly’ is deliberately ambiguous; first, it means:
not common; the errancy [die Irre] is nothing usual or even just negative; it’s the
essential possibility of truth as unconcealment. Where there is concealment,
there’s the possibility of errancy (as in my Truth lecture); then it means: as suspect:
unusually great – the more man thinks, the greater the possibility of errancy – for
the one thinking it is uncommon as such –
These are the errant [Be-irrten] in the proper sense, while the ‘unerring’
[Unbeirrbaren] are those who close their minds to truth & defy it in their uprising
into a groundless self-assurance. (2008, 194, emphasis original)
Here I really appreciate Heidegger’s nice and neat interpretation of the double meanings of “err
uncommonly.” First, as errancy, or so called error or mistake, is not merely negative, it points to
the essence of truth as untruth in the complex interaction between concealment and
62
unconcealment. Secondly, to err is not just a shame, but in essence it involves great opportunity
and at the same time challenge or even danger on the pathway of thinking. In other words, no
errancy, no truth and no thinking. Or, it can be even said that errancy is the glory of great
thinking. This is why Heidegger ascribes the characteristics of “unerring” to those who are close
minded. I believe Heidegger is not trying to find excuses for his own errings, but is encouraging
people to not be afraid of erring for great thinking.
Truth, Untruth and Education
The “[cave] allegory” not only illustrates the essence of education but at the same time
opens our eyes to a transformation in the essence of truth.
Heidegger, 1998/1931, 32, 167
From now on this characterization of the essence of truth as the correctness of both
representation and assertion becomes normative for the whole of Western thinking.
Heidegger, 1998/1931, 32, 178
“Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” (1998/1931-32) is one of Heidegger’s major works
pondering upon the essence of truth along with that of education. Iain Thomson (2002) suggests
this lecture be translated as “Plato’s Teaching of Truth” to preserve Heidegger’s reference to
teaching and the title’s dual implications that 1) education is grounded in (the history of) truth,
and 2) Plato’s doctrine of truth obscures truth’s more primordial meaning (p. 135). In that lecture,
Heidegger presents Plato’s famous allegory of cave which, he says, marks “a change in what
determines the essence of truth” (155). Heidegger says truth originally means “unhiddenness,” “a
wresting away in each case, in the form of a revealing” (171). In that cave allegory, however,
Heidegger writes,
The movement of passage from one place to the other consists in the process
whereby the gaze becomes more correct. Everything depends on the correctness
of the gaze. Through this correctness, seeing or knowing becomes something
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correct so that in the end it looks directly at the highest idea and fixes itself in this
‘direct alignment.’ In so directing itself, apprehending conforms itself to what is
to be seen: the ‘visible form’ of the being. (177)
In Plato’s cave story, while people in the cave gradually ascend to the ground, they are making
progress and getting more and more of a correct view of the world. When they finally see that
brilliant sun, they are thought to be able to see the truest image of the world, or the world itself.
Moreover, in this process, Plato says thinking goes “beyond” the things in the form of shadows
or images and thus “out toward” things as “ideas.” Heidegger argues that this progress view in
the cave allegory results in “an agreement of the act of knowing with the thing itself” – “a
transformation in the essence of truth” in which truth becomes the “correctness of apprehending
and asserting” (177). In the people’s struggling passage in the underground cave, the next higher
place of destination is always truer than current and previous ones. In other words, truth always
gains dominance over untruth, light over darkness. As untruth comes under the yoke of truth in
this movement of passage, Heidegger thinks, “The essence of truth gives up its fundamental trait
of unhiddenness” (176). He claims, ever since Plato, “there has been a striving for ‘truth’ in the
sense of the correctness of the gaze and the correctness of its direction” and “what matters in all
our fundamental orientations toward beings is the achieving of a correct view of the ideas” (179).
This relinquishes the essence of truth as unhiddenness or revealing for all the following years of
history. It moves truth toward a predetermined reality.
In this sense, Heidegger (2002/1945) argues, “Since Plato there has been a fatal
relocation of truth away from concrete things themselves as they naturally show and reveal
themselves in the richness of our vernaculars toward the idea of the exchange of equivalents” (36,
emphasis original). This exchange, Heidegger says, requires a common denominator or standard
measure so that equivalence can be established. In this exchange, the “core” or “essence” of
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beings is preserved while differences are effaced through abstraction, generalization, and
reduction; therefore, truth becomes “the abstract, one-sided, and fragmented truth of general
equivalence” (36).
Heidegger (1998/1931, 32) asserts this significant change of the essence of truth in
Plato’s cave allegory significantly affects the conceptualization of education in the history of
Western thinking as “the essence of ‘education’ is grounded in the essence of ‘truth’” (170).  He
says paideia in the ancient Greek means essentially a movement of passage, the “process
whereby the human essence is reoriented and accustomed to the region assigned to it at each
point” (166). Since paideia means a “turning around” in Plato’s cave allegory, Heidegger argues
that therefore “the fulfillment of the essence of ‘education’ can be achieved only in the region of,
and on the basis of, the most unhidden, i.e., the truest, truth in the proper sense” (170). This shift
in understanding the essence of truth has caused the mutation of paideia, to a passage into
schooling as the “calculated swift, massive distribution of ununderstood information to as many
as possible in the shortest possible time” (Heidegger, in Cooper, 2002, 57). David Cooper (2002)
says the information is “ununderstood” because Plato is “without appreciation either of the status
of the information – as belonging to just this or that particular way in which things are revealed –
or of the possibility of, and the conditions for, access to the types of information he gathers” (57).
In this sense, paideia as education becomes the ascending passage leading students toward the
pursuit (and acquisition) of truth as the correct (re)presentation of objects or highest ideas.
Therefore, truth loses its original meaning of becoming in unhiddenness and its relation of
“always-being-in-the-world” through the unconcealment of Dasein.
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Light and Darkness: Sun and Star
But may one hand me,
Full of dark light
The sweet-scented cup
-- Holderlin, in Heidegger, 1976/1958, 56
In Plato’s cave allegory, the aim is always to see/know more clearly, in more light of the
truth of Sun. Untruth, since the time of Plato, is under the yoke or control of truth, as described
in the cave story, Heidegger disagrees that the distinction or difference between truth and untruth
is similar to that between light and darkness. On the contrary, he thinks the seeming
contradictions of light and darkness always unite and abide like life and death. In “Principles of
Thinking” (1976/1958), Heidegger argues that the concealment in the darkness is the “secret
mystery” of light (Lichten)12 – “The dark keeps what is light in its presence; what is light belongs
to it” (56). Then Heidegger quotes the above lines from Holderlin’s poem, “Andenken,” to
demonstrate this intricate play between light and darkness that exists in all thinking. Furthermore,
he says, if light is merely brightness, light would be no longer Lichtung13 as it is “brighter than
one thousand suns” (56). Heidegger cites from “Tao Te Ching,”
Lao Tzu says (chapter 17): ‘one aware of his brightness keeps to the dark.’ To that
we add the truth that everyone knows but few realize. Mortal thinking must
descend into the dark of the depths of the well if it is to view the stars by day. It is
harder to preserve the clearness of the dark than to produce a brightness which
would seem to shine as brightness only. What would seemingly only shine does
not illuminate. (56)
My understanding of the above quotation is that since truth and untruth are so intermixed with
each other, if truth is taken as absolute objective Truth with untruth as the opposite side of
mistake or error, the brilliant Truth becomes “merely brightness” or even “brighter than one
12 In German, Lichen also means “to empty out” or “to raise up.”
13 Lichtung means “lightening” or “clearing.”
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thousand suns.” This metaphor of the intricate play between light and darkness particularly
attracts me, for I think it does not mean to simply invert the binary of (un)truth, i.e. relocating the
source of truth to darkness, but suggests something happening, not something already existing, in
the dark being (un)revealed. The darkness of untruth, which is actually much richer than the
brightening area of truth, thus becomes only dead dark. Dewey (1958/1925) would take this as a
great pity as the result of that shining Truth, for he thinks, “the realm of meanings is wider than
that of true-and-false meanings; it is more urgent and more fertile” – “Poetic meanings, moral
meanings, a large part of the goods of life are matters of richness and freedom of meanings,
rather than of truth; a large part of our life is carried on in a realm of meanings to which truth and
falsity as such are irrelevant” (411).
I suggest this opaque realm of poetic meanings in Dewey, which can be hardly lightened
through by the radiant sun of Truth, resides in the dynamic of darkness. I love Heidegger’s poetic
saying of descending “into the dark of the depths of the well if it [mortal thinking] is to view the
stars by day.” At the same time, since presently we are so fond of expanding the lightening area
of Truth into darkness, I wonder how we can “preserve the clearness of the dark,” rather than
“produce a brightness which would seem to shine as brightness only.” Is it possible for the truth
to give light rather than shine? Can we still poetically dwell in that peaceful darkness? Or how
can we see those lovely stars in the dazzling daylight of Truth?
When he talks about truth, Heidegger (2002/1945) once tells a story of mapping and
journey. He says when we think of error [Irrnis] as wandering [verirren], it implies truth as
traversing “the distance between the two termini of idea and thing” (38). He then compares
rational thought to taking a walk, which sees its destination before it begins and does not allow
straying [verirren]. Heidegger writes,
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Philosophy’s early form, the Socratic dialogue, is even then resistant to a totally
logical mapping, for it meanders around, tells myths, takes detours… Refusing to
abandon his homeland of Athens, he [Socrates] yet was a stranger in his own land,
while his student’s student, Aristotle the Stagyrite, was a metic, a settled outsider
who made foreign Athens his home. Where Socrates [Plato?] would ostracize
foreign poetry (and rhetoric) from his Republic, Aristotle, tutor to Alexander the
builder of empires, maps a mighty domain in which all human knowledge
[Wissen] is parceled out its inhabitants. The inclusive empire, which claims all
know terrain for itself, leaves no one out, not even barbarian rhetoric or poetry,
which now is civilized and made subject to the higher scientiae of dialectic and
politics. Socrates’ sense of place, whether inside the city-state or outside it, fades
in the Aristotelian empire of knowledge, for all places are now within, and the
totality of space must become all the space that is. (38-39)
When I read this story, two vivid images immediately emerge in my mind: one is the barefoot
Socrates running, meandering and straying on the fields happily and freely, and the other is the
serious, prudent and careful Aristotle untiringly expanding, calculating and measuring his mighty
empire. For Socrates, every place in his journey is different with a different feel, smell and taste
of air, river, grass, flower and soil; for Aristotle, however, every place is just the same marker on
the map with a different size and shape – each is the same without essential difference.
As Heidegger appreciates the wandering of Socrates and critiques Aristotle in this
fascinating story, it reminds me of another story of mapping and journey told by Gregory
Bateson on his personal website.14 It involves a pretty girl who liked to sleep on disused railroad
tracks and a brutal surveyor who ran the trains up and down the tracks in some country. The
surveyor was interested in exploring each branch of the railroad system so that he could mark
them on his maps that the girl was often disturbed in her sleep and compelled to retreat hastily
while a powerful and smelly engine dashed over the very place where she had been happily
resting. The surveyor insisted that it was his right – even his duty – to map the railroad system,
14 Bateson says this story is quoted from Stewart Brand on the CoEvolution Quarterly, Spring 1978, 44-46,
http://www.oikos.org/batallegory.htm.
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and that the whole system was entirely his, including even its unexplored parts. He argued that
the system was a single, entirely logical-causal network of tracks. The girl averred that the tracks
were designed for the rest and peace of the human soul and she cared nothing for his dreams of
causality and logic. Once he had mapped every detail of the tracks along which he ran his
engines, she continually found other parts of the system not yet mapped.
Like that surveyor trying to mechanically measure each inch of all the fields, now we are
trying to intrude into, and thus shine, all darkness with our torches of “philosophy,” “science,”
and “technology.” Will there be any dark place left for the girl’s sweet sleep? If one day the girl
can find nowhere to escape from the logical-causal network of the surveyor, that is the tragedy
for all people, not only for that girl or the man. Jean-Francois Lyotard (1997/1979) tells the final
result of this mapping in quoting another story of map from Jorge Borges: the desire of an
emperor to have “a perfectly accurate map of the empire” leads to the ruin of the country as its
entire population is totally devoted to cartography (55). Lyotard asserts this demonstrates the
failure of “the idea (or ideology) of perfect control over a system” (55). I suggest that it can be
also taken as the failure of pure truth, “a perfectly accurate map” of the reality/world.
When I try to think about what will be the result of such violent or ruthless lighting which
shines but does not give light, one joke or parable I have heard before suddenly comes to my
mind. One evening, an old lady saw a man nervously looking for something under a street light.
She then came to ask him, “What are you looking for? What can I do to help?” The man replied
gratefully, “Thank you! I am looking for my keys.” “But there is no key on the ground here. Why
don’t you look anywhere else?” “Because there is no light beyond the streetlight. How can I see
in the darkness?” I laughed loudly when I first heard this joke. But now I cannot even smile at it.
It shows how silly it is that we expect truth and answers to be in the very small part of the world
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that we are privileged enough to think we can see and measure and understand, our
unwillingness to acknowledge the vast space of “darkness,” what we do not know and cannot
measure.
“How can I see in the darkness” is not a simple or naïve question. For Heidegger, as “the
origin of the principles of thinking, the place of the thinking that posits them,” this darkness is
not “pitch blackness as the complete, sheer absence of light” but “secret mystery of what is light”
(55-56). Therefore, he claims that we must learn to “recognize the dark as the ineluctable and to
keep at a distance those prejudices which destroy the lofty sway of the dark” (56). While we are
so accustomed to the shining light of Truth, which is “brighter than one thousand suns,” and thus
see and think the world under this dazzling light, we have forgotten how to protect the purity of
the darkness to “view the stars by day.” Even worse, are we in some sense becoming blind in that
strongly shining Truth? It might be a big step forward for us to get from the chaotic darkness into
the daylight of Truth/knowledge/knowing, but now the critical question with which we are
confronted is, how can we “step back” (using one of Heidegger’s favorite phrases) to appreciate
the richness of the concealed beauty in darkness? Or can we see the stars in the daylight? Is there
a middle space between darkness and light?
The Intricate Play between Brightness and Darkness in Clearings
The shining of the clearing is in itself simultaneously a self-veiling – and is in this sense
what is darkest.
-- Heidegger, in May, 1996, 32
As people walk through the forest, the first thing they need to do, Heidegger says, is to
make an open place in the woods free of trees. This openness in the midst of beings is a clearing.
Heidegger (1993/1966) says this word of clearing, Lichtung, in old German language, can be
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traced back to the verb, lichten, and adjective, licht, which is as same as the word, “light.”
Therefore, Heidegger thinks clearing also means to lighten something – to “make it light, free
and open” (441). He writes,
What is light in the sense of being free and open has nothing in common with the
adjective ‘light’ which means ‘bright,’ neither linguistically nor materially. This is
to be observed for the difference between clearing and light. Still it is possible
that a material relation between the two exists. Light can stream into the clearing,
into its openness, and let brightness play with darkness in it. But light never first
creates the clearing. Rather, light presupposes it. (441-442)
Here again we see the “clear” distinction between light and bright along with the intertwined
relationship between brightness and darkness in Heidegger when he explains one of the most
important keywords in his conceptual framework, “clearing.” Just imagine when one walks into
the deep forest in night with a lantern, the beams of light suddenly illuminate the area around the
lantern, a clearing thus emerges. But this clearing of open region is not the creation of the light
from that lantern. Light operates through clearing, not vice versa. Light brings much more than
merely brightening which only shines. Shadows always go with light as brightness plays with
darkness in the clearing.
Heidegger critiques that “philosophy knows nothing of the clearing” although it “does
speak about the light of reason” (443). I think he is suggesting that philosophy does not know the
intricate play between brightness and darkness in the clearing. Through “the light of reason”
from our own lantern of philosophy and/or later science and technology, we are very confident
that we can have the right and clear vision of everything in the dazzling brightness of the
clearing. We even believe that the ever expanding light could one day reach and cover every
corner of the forest in the night. This reminds me of one story from “The Classic of Mountains
and Seas,” one of the oldest books of folklore and fairy stories in ancient China with a history of
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over 2,300 years (Birrell, 1999). In that story, a man named “Kua Fu” hates darkness in night and
determines to chase the sun to catch it so that he can fix the sun in the sky in both day and night.
He spends his whole life chasing after the sun and dies of the extreme heat of sunshine. As Kua
Fu is teased in this seemingly silly story of chasing the sun, are we in some sense just like him in
our unceasing pursuit to improve our lantern in the hope that one day it could permanently keep
off the darkness in night? Few can understand that darkness is as important as, or even more
important than, light for the coming of clearings.
When I read Heidegger’s phrase of brightness as “brighter than one thousand suns,” I
cannot help thinking of the image of the extremely shining atomic bombing in Hiroshima. After
quoting two of most startling arguments of “To know is to kill” and “Man is the wolf of science”
from French philosopher Michel Serres, William Doll (2010) says what is really devastating
about this bombing is not its quantity of destruction, however great it was, but “the rational
(“good”) reasons given for its occurrence,” and then he critiques “a new sense of power: a power
to create and a power to destroy” that man has acquired after World War II (6-7). In this sense,
without the wisdom of keeping or protecting the “purity of darkness,” we cannot be aware of the
implicit huge danger under the brightness of light. When we are complacent enough to announce
that we can see and thus know, through the beams of light, like Kua Fu, we try to put our lantern
high up in the sky as the ever shining sun. Then the lantern [of knowledge] becomes a deadly
weapon which shines more than just bright light and, as argued by Serres, kills.
As stated in the beginning quote of this section, Heidegger visions the clearing as the
brightest and at the same time darkest area under the beams of light. In other words, the clearing
is free for both the bright and the dark. Here, I want to take one step further to discuss the play
between brightness as truth and darkness as untruth, in the clearing of thinking. While Heidegger
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says only this clearing “grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we
ourselves are not, and access to be being that we ourselves are,” he (1993/1936) admits, “yet a
being can be concealed, as well, only within the sphere of what is cleared” (178). Clearing here
is a metaphor of the open place that we build in the forest by clearing trees for our travels.
Without this clearing, we cannot make wood paths through the forest for new destinations.
The openness in the clearing, however, does not guarantee the unconcealment of truth.
Concealment also occurs in what is cleared: “the open place in the midst of beings, the clearing,
is never a rigid stage with a permanently raised curtain on which the play of beings runs its
course. Rather, the clearing happens only as this double concealment [of truth]” (180). This
means that clearing is not merely erasing or destroying untruth for the construction of truth.
When clearing unconceals, it also conceals the fact that it conceals and this is really a “double
concealment.” In other words, when we clear, think, discover and make conclusions, beings are
unconcealed, and at the same time concealed in the clearings – truth and untruth mix with each
other in the clearing. This is why Heidegger claims that “Clearing of openness and establishment
in the open region belong together” as “the same single essence of the happening of truth” (186).
Heidegger presents an example of such happening of truth in his lecture, “The Origin of
the Work of Art” (1993/1936). One main reason for him to chooses art to show the
unconcealment of truth in the clearing is that usually art is associated with beauty or aesthetics
and truth with logic, but he argues, on the contrary, the essence of art is “a becoming and
happening of truth” (196, emphasis original).15 In this sense, Heidegger thinks that beauty is one
of the ways “in which truth essentially occurs as unconcelament” (181). Art as the disclosure of
15 Heidegger (1999/1935) thinks, “The history of the essence of Western art corresponds to the change in the essence
of truth” (206).
73
truth is not because art is an imitation or description of particular actual things, but because it
opens up an open region, the clearing of beings. As the truth of beings sets itself to work in art,
Heidegger writes,
The establishing of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being such as never
was before and will never come to be again. The bringing forth places this being
in the open region in such a way that what is to be brought forth first clears the
openness of the open regions into which it comes forth. Where this bringing forth
expressly brings the openness of beings, or truth, that which is brought forth is a
work. Creation is such a bringing forth. (187)
Heidegger explains this clearing “makes space for that spaciousness” which especially means to
“liberate the free space of the open region and to establish it in its structure” (170). It is in the
open space opened by clearing in which the work of art thus can erect up a world for people. And
art discloses what is in truth in setting up such a world. In short, Heidegger thinks “It is due to
art’s poetic essence that, in the midst of beings, art breaks open an open place, in whose openness
everything is other than usual.” (197). In this sense, Heidegger compares art to poetry, both of
which let truth happen and unfold unconcealment in the open region – “in the midst of beings,
the open region brings beings to shine and ring out” (197). Moreover, he states, this happening of
truth comes neither from things at hand, the ordinary, nor from aimless imaginings of
whimsicalities, but from “the openness that makes its advent in throwness is projected” (196,
emphasis added).
As suggested by the translator of this lecture, Heidegger here presents two fundamental
existential characteristics of Dasein: as Dasein is thrown or cast in what it is, it is also projected
toward its possibilities as possibilities. Standing before any painting by a great artist, what opens
people is not just the depiction of any actual thing in the painting, but something beyond
projected in the clearings of open region by Dasein in its own ways in that moment. This is why
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Heidegger says, “The work makes public something other than itself; it manifests something
other; it is an allegory” (145).
Compared with art, Heidegger critiques that by contrast, “science is not an original
happening of truth, but always the cultivation of a domain of truth already opened, specifically
by apprehending and confirming that which shows itself to be possibly and necessarily correct
within that field” (187). This makes me think of two different modes of teaching, teaching as
science and teaching as art. In teaching as science, no real clearing or opening of the open region
occurs, for students only need to apprehend and confirm what is shown to them in the form of
already opened truth. But teaching as art must let truth originate for according to Heidegger, art
is “the spring that leaps to the truth of beings in the work” (202).
Furthermore, Heidegger argues that in the advent of the happening of truth in art, “the
artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys
itself in the creative process for the work to emerge” (166). This means it is not the artist who
makes the work, although s/he does make it, but the work makes the artist. In teaching as art, can
it be said that it is the teaching that makes the teacher, the one who teaches to help students’
learning, not the teacher who conducts the teaching? It is through the teaching that students come
to the emergence of truth in their own ways as they are at the same time thrown into and
projected outward by the unhiddenness or unconcealment of beings. Then genuine learning
happens. As Heidegger (1993/1951,52) says, “To learn means to make everything we do answer
to whatever essentials address us at a given time” (380); teaching, unlike instructing, means to let
learn, to present evocative work to students for their critical responses.
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Conclusion
It can be said that truth is one of the most important issues in Heidegger’s lifelong work,
especially between 1927 and 1943. During that period, “the question of truth assumes the
greatest urgency in Heidegger’s thought and comes to determine most powerfully and most
transparently the itinerary of that thought” (Sallis, 1999, 20). As Being is the fundamental
concern throughout his life, Heidegger argues in “Being and Time” that, “Being (not entities) is
something which ‘there is’ only in so far as truth is” because “Being and truth ‘are’
equiprimordially” (272). He argues the essence of Being is not the concealed core of being but is
the happenings of unconcealment of truth.
During my struggle with the question of truth related to teaching, reading Heidegger’s
phenomenological works, especially those on (un)truth and clearing, became a great help. This
chapter first explains why Heidegger interests me in my inquiry project on “en-teaching,” and
introduces his personal life history to contextualize our understandings of his theoretical works,
including the complexities and contradictions of his associations with Nazis. Then I discuss
Heidegger’s concept of “let learn” through “always-being-in-the-world,” and finally focus on his
complex exploration of (un)truth, an intricate play between brightness and darkness in clearings.
In the next chapter, I will go further to explore my notion of en-teaching based upon Heidegger’s
thoughts of teaching and learning with insights from Lao Tzu and Dewey.
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Chapter Four
En-Teaching: A Powerful Pedagogy
The ironist … takes the unit of persuasion to be a vocabulary rather than a
proposition. Her method is redescription rather than inference. Ironists specialize
in redescribing ranges of objects or events in partially neologistic jargon, in the
hopes that by the time she is finished using old words in new senses, not to
mention introducing brand new words, people will no longer ask questions
phrased in the old words.
– Richard Rorty, 1989, 78
Building upon Heidegger’s notions of teaching and learning, especially his work on
(un)truth, in this chapter I develop further the notion of en-teaching, with additional insights
from Lao Tzu and John Dewey, well recognized in the US and China as an educational reformer,
one who railed against teaching-as-telling. Heidegger’s ideas about thinking and language,
especially his work after “Being and Time” (1927) from the 1930s to 1970s, can be aligned with
Taoist philosophy in many ways. Heidegger is often regarded as “the only Western philosopher
who not only thoroughly intellectually understands but has intuitively grasped Taoist thought”
(Chang, 1974, 138), perhaps owing to his Japanese students at the University of Marburg and the
University of Freiburg. The striking similarity between Heidegger’s works and Taoist thought
has gained attention of Heideggerian scholars (Stambaugh, 1984; Parkes, 1987; Poggeler, 1987).1
When I explored Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective on (un)truth for insights into
taken-for-granted assumptions about education and the purposes of teaching and learning, I
noticed a strong resonance between his notion of “clearing” and the essential spirit of Taoism,
“the Tao of inaction.” Following Rorty’s ironist suggestion that a new vocabulary is needed to
shift us from our old ways of thinking – as Heidegger himself was known for imbuing old words
1 For more on the parallel between Heidegger’s thoughts and Taoism, see “Heidegger and Asian Thought” (1987)
edited by Parkes.
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with new senses and coining or appropriating words – I proffer the neologism, “en-teaching.”
Drawing on Heidegger’s insights in regard to language, Rorty was well aware, in making the
statement above, of the habitual ways in which we use language, how language shapes thought,
and how meaning – and our thinking – shifts over time. The prefix en- was chosen for three main
reasons. First of all, it implies a transformative change from nouns to verbs. As suggested in
words such as “enact,” “encode,” and “encourage,” en-teaching focuses on teaching as a verb, a
dynamic, lived, interactive process. While “teaching” as a gerund implies the teacher’s teaching
behavior, en-teaching focuses on what makes a teacher, as s/he relates to students. In other words,
while “teaching” indicates “the teacher teaches,” en-teaching suggests “it is teaching that makes
the teacher… more teachable.” 2 Therefore, en-teaching is enticing, endowing, enabling,
engaging, enjoying and enchanting.
Second, although the prefix en- in English often means “to make into, to put into, to get
into” as in the words “encompass,” “enwrap,” and “envelope,” what en-teaching tries to enter is
not a fixed system which “enframes”3 – a key word Heidegger uses to critique the essence of
modern technology – but a dynamic relation, “being with the world.”  According to Heidegger
(1992/1925), Dasein is not self-contained but rather absorbed in the world it encounters
concretely and practically: Dasein shows itself “as being with the world” (156). This echoes the
“collectivist turn” Jurgen Habermas (1991) points out in Heidegger: Dasein becomes “no longer
this poor Kierkegaardian-Sartrean individual hanging in the air, in Sorge” but “the Dasein of the
people, of the Volk” (189). In this sense, this “being with the world” is always “being in
2 This refers back to Heidegger’s argument (1993/1951, 52), “The teacher must be capable of being more teachable
than the apprentices” (380), as discussed in the chapter three.
3 Heidegger says the root of the word “technology” in ancient Greek is Techne, referring not only to activities and
skills of craftsman but also those of fine arts. In other words, it “does not at all lie in making and manipulating, nor
in the using of means, but rather in the revealing” (1993/1949, 319). However, Heidegger thinks this revealing in
modern technology becomes “Ge-stell” [enframing] and thus totally different from art (210).
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relation,” not just with the people in the world, but in a world that “worlds.” Since en-teaching
entwines, enmeshes and entangles as a relational process, it does not encapsulate, enclose or
enforce. In other words, en-teaching opens up rather than closes down.
Third, the hyphen in en-teaching suggests both the rupture and relation between en-
teaching and teaching – a dynamic and generative space full of tensions. Rather than suggesting
an opposition of teaching, passively not teaching, this view of teaching opens up as a
phenomenological way of being in the classroom described by en-teaching and has significant
implications not only for relations in the classroom including students’ relationships with content
and knowing, but also for curriculum.
Throughout this chapter, I will insert boxes of conversations4 among Heidegger, Lao Tzu
and Dewey, as well as others, to illustrate the rich and dynamical interactions among them
which point to  the not-yet possibilities of en-teaching. While trying to juxtapose the complex
thoughts of the three great thinkers through conversations, I do not want to conflate them,
especially the dissonance of the different cultural and philosophical traditions respectively from
which they come. I suggest the simple comparisons among the three thinkers are impossible.
Drawing on Heidegger’s critique of modern technology and his analysis of the nature of
language, I see en-teaching as a “non-willing,”5 a refusal of the will to control; and I develop the
concept (en-teaching) as a resonance among Heidegger, Lao Tsu, and Dewey, involving: (1) a
clearing between truth and untruth, (2) the call of the Way of Tao as waying, (3) “wait[ing] in
silent readiness,” and (4) the “noiseless ringing of stillness.” I include Dewey in the
conversations with Heidegger and Lao Tzu to explore the implications of en-teaching in
4 All sayings in the conversation boxes are direct quotations from the referenced sources; but no quotation mark is
inserted to interrupt the flow in conversations. All quotations from Lao Tzu’s “Tao Te Ching” are translated by me
except for one that is referenced as translated  by Mair.
5 Heidegger (1966/1944, 45) says thinking, understood as re-presenting, is willing – “to think is to will and to will is
to think” (59). He argues we thus want “non-willing” which means “weaning ourselves from willing” (60).
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classrooms, to form a pedagogical bridging between Eastern and Western thoughts through a
bridge “which is not a bridge” (Aoki, 2005, 228). Dewey’s two year experience of lecturing in
China, his long-term relationships with Chinese scholars and philosophers in both America and
China, qualifies him function in this capacity.
En-Teaching as Clearing between Truth and Untruth
Problematizing truth as it relates to what and why we should teach complicates how we
consider the teaching-learning relationship. As discussed in the previous chapter, Heidegger
argues truth is essentially untruth and vice versa, for both are (un)concealments of being – the
two coexist and intermix with each other like light and darkness. This echoes Dewey’s argument
of truth as “true if: if certain other things eventually
present themselves; and when these latter things occur
they in turn suggest further possibilities; the operation of
doubt-inquiry-finding recurs” (1958, 154-155, emphasis
original). This quality is a fundamental but an easily
forgotten characteristic of truth. If the teacher is blind to
this “if” quality of truth, teaching becomes simply telling.
How can the teacher teach, if as suggested by Lao Tzu, “he does not know”? In other
words, can the teacher en-teach, adopting an attitude of being-in-relation, if he does not possess
truth? This question is, in essence, the same as Heidegger’s questioning of how to “view the
stars by day” in a deep well. This metaphor of the well is much akin to another of Heidegger’s
metaphors – that of the jug as a clearing, an opening in which truth happens. Heidegger takes the
essence of jug or the jugness of jug in terms of its voidness rather than its material construction.
Heidegger: Truth, in its essence, is
untruth. (1993/1936, 179)
Dewey: Any logic which identified
the technique of knowing with
demonstration of truths already
possessed by the mind, blunts the
spirit of investigation and
confines the mind within the
circle of traditional learning.
(1965/1948, 33)
Lao Tzu: He has to know he does not
know. (Tao Te Ching, Ch. 71)
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As the voidness of the jug lets it hold fluid, thus making it a jug, the deep holeness of the well
allows the spring of water to flow into it, thus making it a well. The essence of well as opening,
therefore, lies in its “is” as a rift, in its being as emptiness. This emphasis on the “voidness,”
“emptiness” or “the sheer ‘not’ of beings” (1993/1936, 196) in the Heideggerian truth is echoed
in Taoism: Lao Tzu argues that Tao is “empty, yet never refills with use” (1990/500 B.C., 62).
Not coincidently, Lao Tzu uses the same metaphor of the emptiness of the jug in his “Tao Te
Ching” written about 2,500 years ago:
Thirty spokes converge on a single hub,
But it is in the space where there is nothing
That the usefulness of the cart lies.
Clay is molded to make a pot,
But it is in the space where there is nothing
That the usefulness of the clay pot lies.
Cut out doors and windows to make a room,
But it is in the spaces where there is nothing
That the usefulness of room lies.
Therefore,
Benefit may be derived from something,
But it is in nothing that we find usefulness.
(Chap. 11, translated by Mair, 1990/500 B.C., 70)
Both Heidegger and Lao Tzu agree here that it is the “not” of being that constitutes the essence
of beings – presence derives from absence, establishment from clearing, something from nothing.
Heidegger adds that nothingness as clearing is “more in being than are beings”: “This open
center is therefore not surrounded by beings; rather, the clearing center itself encircles all that is,
as does the nothing, which we scarcely know” (178, emphasis added). Since the open space of
the clearing can accommodate everything “as does the nothing,” it is neither merely a quick
deconstructive process of erasing or swiping away untruth from truth nor a sharp beam of
dazzling light, which is “brighter than one thousand suns,” to try to “enlighten” the whole forest,
but the reopening of openings toward new possibilities, i.e. making holes in beings.
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This emphasis on the “emptiness” or “voidness,” i.e. the “not” of beings, is unusual from
a Western perspective, where it seems, Nature abhors a vacuum.6 In China, however, reference to
emptiness is quite common. One of the oldest Chinese sayings is “Teacher must first have a full
bucket of water of knowledge and then s/he can fill in students’ small cups.” This is still a widely
used slogan for teachers, especially in teacher education
programs in China. Here students are taken as empty
vessels but in a sense different from the meaning of
“empty” in Lao Tzu and Heidegger. In the former, the
state of “empty” is measured by that of “full” and thus
“emptiness” is regarded as a negative state that needs to
be finished, i.e. “filled,” as soon as possible. In other
words, “voidness” is not recognized and valued as “the primary condition of growth” as Dewey
argues.  The “void” immaturity, according to Dewey, is, “emptiness” of students in school. If the
teacher aims to “help” students to overcome this immaturity by filling their empty cups full from
his/her own bucket, two results are striking: students will have the same water as their teacher’s
and their cups will be always smaller than the teacher’s bucket. Growth will always be less.
The “voidness” of the well, like the immaturity of students, is not “emptiness.” As the
well gets the spring of water from the deep earth through its “empty” hole to the ground, its
“emptiness” or “voidness” is generative in a lived manner, a condition of its being a well.
Similarly students have their deep earth not only in their school lives with peers, but at home and
in their community, especially under the powerful influence of mass media in a rapidly changing
society. On the other hand, as argued by Lao Tzu, “Being and nonbeing constitute each other”;
6 This commonly heard idiom is attributed Baruch Spinoza (2008/1667), proposition 15, in his Ethics, Part I,
Concerning God.
Heidegger: Nothing is the
characteristic [Kennzeichnung]
of Being. (quoted in May, 21)
Dewey: The primary condition of
growth is immaturity....But the
prefix “im” of the word
immaturity means something
positive, not a mere void or lack.
(1916, 41)
Lao Tzu: Being and nonbeing
constitute each other (Tao TeChing, Ch. 2)
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the “fullness” of the teacher’s bucket is not really “full.” No bucket or jug can keep the same
water fresh for a long time. As one traditional Chinese phrase says, “running water is never stale”:
any subject material viewed as the water of truth has to be constantly refreshed or cleared.
Therefore, en-teaching encourages both teachers and students to recognize and value
“holes” whose “voidness” or “emptiness” allows them to search for new possibilities of what is
not yet. The “holes” in students, as “immaturities,” are their potentials to be carefully nourished
but not directed or channeled. Dewey (1966/1916) asserts that if the “voidness” of students’
immaturities are treated positively, they would “tell a different tale” from the teacher’s telling
(42). This reminds me of one recent conversation with my four-year-old daughter: “Tracy, why
do you paint this girl’s cheeks in blue in your drawing? Girls should have a pretty pink face.”
“No, blue is as pretty as pink.” “Have you ever seen any blue face in girls?” “Of course.” “Oh
boy, who?” “Avatar.” 7 How often have students been told by their teachers, what they
“should/must” and “should/must not” do in their lives? If this teaching-as-telling becomes
successful, everybody in each generation will tell the same story without any surprise. If nobody
can paint blue people, how can “Avatar” be created? In this sense, en-teaching is a clearing space
which “encircles all that is, as does the nothing” 8 – it accommodates and encourages students’
lived imagination and creativity, activating potentials in the “voidness” of their immaturities to
cultivate future innovative scientists, poets, writers, artists, and even statesmen.
Nurturing the “holes” in students also calls teachers, borrowing Heidegger’s phrase, to
“step back” to their own “holes” – a precious opportunity for teachers to develop their potentials.
One of the most valuable suggestions I have received in teaching is from my major professor
who tells me that, as he steps into the classroom at the beginning of each class, he asks himself,
7 A movie released in 2009 which tells of an imaginary planet. Its residents are blue and called “Avatar.”
8 For Heidegger’s understanding of clearing, refer to chapter three.
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“What can I learn from my students today?” Once teachers ask this question of themselves, they
become “empty” or “cleared” for the advent of the happening of truth. This echoes the saying in
Chap. 7 of the “Tao Te Ching,” translated by Heidegger in one of his letters to a Chinese
philosopher: “The sage empties his self and his self is preserved. Is this so because he has
thought of self? Because of this he is able to fulfill himself” (in Hsiao, 1987, 99). It is this
emptiness/clearing of the sage’s self that allows the dynamic fulfilling to come.
When we know that we do not know (Socrates’s greatest virtue), knowing and not-
knowing constitute each other. This is also the secret to “Keeping Knowledge Alive.” 9
Furthermore, possibilities for new explorations are recognized in this interactive and
corresponsive flow between the “holes” of students and teachers as they question subjects and
subjectivities. As Lao Tzu argues that “All beings come from nothingness” (Ch. 40), I suggest
genuine teaching and learning stem from the generative “holes” in students, teachers and subject
materials as clearings of “emptiness” or “voidness.” For Heidegger (1971/1959), this clearing in
the sense of “to clear a way” means to “form a way and, forming it, to keep it ready” – it does
not mean to move things up or down on a prescribed path but “to bring the way” (129-130). In
other words, clearing is way-making or more specifically waying, a key word in not only
Heidegger’s phenomenological work, but also Lao Tzu’s Taoist thoughts.
En-Teaching as Responding to the Call of the Way of Tao as Waying
In many versions of the translation of “Tao Te Ching” by Lao Tzu, the word “Tao” is
translated as “way.” This is not surprising because the original meaning of the Chinese character,
道 (Tao), is the way or path on which people walk. It is not a coincidence that Heidegger
9 “Keeping Knowledge Alive” is the title of Doll’s journal article in 2005.
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(2002/1945) adopts the metaphor of path/way, which he uses so often in his works, as being “the
guiding principle” of his thought (32). Through his collaboration with a Chinese philosopher in
translating “Tao Te Ching” in 1946, specifically its eight chapters concerning “Tao,” he acquired
a deeper understanding of “Tao” as “way” than other Western scholars. In his 1957 lecture, “The
Principle of Identity,” Heidegger regards “the Greek logos and Chinese tao as untranslatable
guiding words of thinking” (in Poggeler, 51).  He further explains in “The Nature of Language”
(1971/1959) that “The key word in Laotse’s10 poetic thinking is Tao, which ‘properly speaking’
means way,” “the way that gives all ways” as “a great hidden stream which moves all things
along and makes way for everything” – “All is way” (92, emphasis added). In this sense, Tao is
the originary way that calls for and gives way. Heidegger (1981) thinks humans must listen to
this “call of the pathway” for it “awakens a sense which loves the free and open” (72). Here the
word of “the” in “the way” of Tao does not imply that there is only “one and best” way but the
great underlying force of calling for ways, giving ways and making ways. How does en-teaching
respond to the call of the way of Tao?
Before addressing this question, I would like first to analyze Heidegger’s (1993/1951-52)
interpretation of “call”:
We are now supposed to use the word ‘to call’ in a signification that one might
paraphrase approximately with the verbs summon, demand, instruct, direct. We
call on someone who is in our way to give way, to make room. But the ‘call’ does
not necessarily imply demand, still less command; it rather implies an anticipatory
reaching out for something that is reached by our call, through our calling.
In the widest sense, ‘to call’ means to set in motion, to get something under way –
which may be done in a gentle and therefore unobstrusive manner, and in fact is
most readily done that way. In the New Testament, Matthew 8:18, we read Videns
autem Jesus turbas multas circum se, iussit ire trans fretum. [‘But seeing a large
crowd about him, Jesus ‘commanded’ them to go across the sea.’] Luther
translates, Und da Jesus viel Volks um sich sah, hiess er hinuber jenseit des
Meeres fahren. [‘And when Jesus saw many people around him he called them to
10 The name of Lao Tzu is also often translated as Laotse, Laotzu, or Lao Zi.
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go over across the sea.’] To call [heissen] here corresponds to the Latin iubere of
the Vulgate, which properly means to wish that something might happen. Jesus
‘called’ them to go over: he did not give a command or issue an order. What
heissen in this passage means comes to light more clearly if we keep to the older
version of the Gospel. Here we read, Idon de ho Iesous ochlon peri auton
ekeleusin apelthein eis to peran [‘Seeing a large crowd around him, Jesus called
to them to go to the other side’]. The Greek verb keleuein properly means to get
something on the road, to get it under way. The Greek noun keleuthos means way.
And that the old word ‘to call’ means not so much a command as a letting-reach,
that therefore the ‘call’ has an assonance of helpfulness and complaisance, is
shown by the fact that the same word in Sanskrit means something like ‘to invite.’
(386-387)
This is an unusual understanding of call, not in the sense of “demand,” “command” or “instruct.”
Instead, it suggests the possible “reaching out” on the way. Heidegger says (1971/1959), “The
way is such, it lets us reach what concerns and summons us” – it lets us reach “what reaches out
for us by touching us, by being our concern” (91). Notice here that what way calls us to reach is
not what is in our way, but what has already touched us and thus concerns us. In other words, this
calling is an inviting. As Jesus invites rather than commands, lets or allows people to go over the
sea, he shows an example of en-teaching. While teaching-as-telling claims to guide and instruct
students in a process of elevation from the deep darkness of the underground to the ground above,
illuminated by the Sun of Truth, en-teaching steps back to invite students to reach out for what
intrinsically summons them on their own way. This “stepping back” is not to passively retreat,
but to “give way” to students. Heidegger interprets the phrase “give way” as “the original giver
and founder of ways” (92): only the teacher’s way-giving can yield possibilities to students’ way-
making while the essence of the Way of Tao is waying. Not coincidently, en-teaching echoes the
ancient meaning of the word “curriculum.” Its Latin root of “currere” 11 is understood not in its
11 At the end of his presentation paper in the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association,
William Pinar (1975) states that the method of currere in education lets us try to “generalize on the basis of the
stories we tell and the ones we hear others tell, taking them as evidence of a sort, and attempt to formulate in general
terms the broad outlines of past, present and future, the nature of our experience, and specially our educational
experience, that is the way we can understand our present in the way that allows us to move on, more learned, more
evolved than before.”
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modern meaning as a static running track as a noun, but as the verb form of ways on which
people are running (Grumet, 1976, 36). The essence of currere lies in its waying as a verb –
curriculum as a lived process of way-giving and way-making.
In giving way, en-teaching is mindful not to force the way upon students – “The way is
never to be prescribed for the individual – or for the
student” (Greene, 1967, 106). As suggested in the
conversation box, when confronted with different
ways motivated by the undercurrents of the Way of
Tao, one has to walk on his/her own way, but this
chosen path is, only a way, rather than the way or
“shelter.” In Heidegger’s book of Holzwege
(“Woodpath”), a collection of his major essays
between the 1930s and 1940s, he writes in the
Foreword that “In the wood are paths that mostly
wind until they end quite suddenly in an impenetrable thicket. They are called ‘woodpaths.’ Each
goes its peculiar way, but in the same forest” (quoted in Krell, 1993, 34). David Krell, the editor
of Holzwege, says that the French translators of Holzwege call it “ways that lead nowhere” and
then argues that the woodpath does lead somewhere which however can never be predicted or
controlled, since the way is made my walking.
Ways or paths wind in the wood according to its trees. The same way-giving offered by
en-teaching in what is cleared can lead to different way-makings in students. As noted, Greene
responds to those who ask her “the way” that “This is my way; where is yours?” Since “the way”
does not exist, everyone including both teacher and student has to find his/her own walking way.
Heidegger: Being and Time is a way
and not a shelter. Whoever cannot
walk should not take refuge in it. A
way, not ‘the’ way, which ever exists.
(in Parkes, 106, emphasis original)
Dewey: The ways in which we believe
and expect have a tremendous
affect upon what we believe and
expect. (1958, 14, emphasis
original)
Lao Tzu: Tao/Way can never be
rationalized. (Tao Te Ching, Ch. 1)
Greene: This is my way; where is
yours?” –thus I answered those who
asked me “the way.” For the way—
that does not exist. (1967, 106,
emphasis original)
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This challenges those practicing en-teaching to be open and accommodating to the emergence of
different modes of way-makings and ways. Both teachers and students are always walking on
their particular ways which appear “at every juncture in a different light, with a different tone,
and stimulates different interpretations” (Heidegger, 1981, 21). For Heidegger (1971/1959), on
the way means to “put oneself on a journey, to experience” and thus “to learn” (143). This echoes
Dewey’s focus on “experience” in education, that the “experience” is, in essence, the process of
experiencing.
Experience is one of the most important key words in Dewey’s theoretical framework and
appears frequently in his works. As stated in the conversation box, he takes experiencing as a
dynamic process of plunging into, undergoing,
suffering, absorbing and being absorbed into. In this
plunging into, we learn not only more about that into
which we plunge, but also more about ourselves. We
emerge from this plunging into, the undergoing,
more knowledgeable, more experienced, and wiser.12
When I read this paragraph, written by Dewey (in the
conversation box) about one hundred years ago, I
remembered my daughter Tracy, struggling with her wooden jigsaw puzzles, only occasionally
asking help from me. In this struggle, whenever she found two matching pieces, she exclaimed,
clapped, laughed and turned to me to share her pleasure. I gave her big smiles and believed this
little discoverer was experiencing the joy which Dewey (1966/1916) takes as “the joy of
intellectual constructiveness – of creativeness” (159). I try to help her in this process: when I
give useful suggestions, Tracy pats my shoulder, “Smart, Mom!”; if my suggestions do not work,
12 For more on John Dewey’s sense of wisdom, see Doll’s Daxia lecture, “The Wisdom of John Dewey” (2010).
Heidegger: To experience something
means to attain it along the way, by
going on a way. To undergo an
experience with something means
that this something, which we reach
along the way in order to attain it,
itself pertains to us, meets and makes
its appeal to us, in that it transforms
us into itself.  (1971/1959, 73-74)
Dewey: The esthetic or undergoing
phase of experience is receptive. It
involves surrender. (1934, 53,
emphasis added)
Lao Tzu: Tao/Way grows all beings.
(Tao Te Ching, Ch. 51)
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she shrugs, “Mmm, we need to rethink about this piece.” If Dewey is right that no experience can
be given, that Tracy’s experiencing has to be “created” by herself, my best role is to help Tracy
do her own “crafting of an experience”13 – by giving way to her.
In this lived rhythm of experiencing as “intakings and outgivings” (using Dewey’s
metaphor of experiencing as breathing, 1934, 56), en-teaching needs to recognize that waying is
for reaching, not transferring. Experiencing is not merely to attain something, but to respond to
the call that “pertains to us, meets and makes its appeal to us,” and to enter the transformative
bond with it. In other words, the process of experiencing in waying is more important than the
attainment of a particular experience on the way: the call is an invitation that has to be nurtured
rather than issued as a direct demand, command or instruction. When one is called, one is
obliged to respond and thus surrenders to it. This surrendering as the “yielding of the self”
(Dewey, 1934, 53) gives way while no one way is given to the self. As Heidegger (1981/1947-48)
says, “the call of the pathway speaks only as long as there are men” who are “servants of their
origin, not slaves of machination” (70). He critiques that “the will to will” as the essence of
modern technology would cause us to be deaf to this call. Next I explore the possibility of en-
teaching as “wait[ing] in silent readiness.”
13 Doll uses Philip Jackson’s phrase (1998) “crafting of an experience,” in discussing Dewey’s concept of
“experience” in his “Crafting An Experience.”
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En-Teaching as “Wait[ing] in Silent Readiness”
As suggested in the conversation box, Heidegger thinks the essence of modern
technology is not the technological itself but the way that technology comes from man’s “will to
mastery” and thus dominates our present
society. He says in the modern technological
society, “everywhere everything is ordered to
stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to
stand there just so that it may be on call for a
further ordering…We call it the standing-
reserve [Bestand]” (1993/1949, 322). For
Heidegger, the greatest danger of modern
technology is that one day man would be taken as standing-reserve while still living in the
illusion that everything he encounters is his construct. Man thinks he is now the lord of the world
and earth by the tool of technology, but he is actually willed, mastered, and controlled by
technology, especially as technology has already “moved long since beyond his [man’s] will”
and “outgrown his capacity for decision” (Heidegger, 1966/1955, 51).
This phrase “being willed by the will to will” is comparable to Chuang Tzu’s phrase, “the
heart of machines.”14 The quotation in the conversation box comes from a story in “Chuang
Tzu,” the explanation of a peasant to a scholar as to why he refuses to use technological
instruments to make his fieldwork easier. What worries the peasant, who knows the technologies,
is not the use of technological tools but the way he might be dominated by the will to control.
14 The relation between Lao Tzu and Zhuang Tzu is, in some sense, that between Socrates and Plato. They can be
taken as the two most important Taoist thinkers and this is why the Taoist philosophy is also often called Lao-
Chuang philosophy. Zhuang Tzu’s “Zhuang Tzu” and Lao Tzu’s “Tao Te Ching” are two foundemental classics in
Taoism. Also note the difference in spelling between Chuang and Zhuang.
Heidegger: The will to mastery becomes all the
more urgent the more technology threatens
to slip from human control (1993/1949, 313)
Chuang Tzu: Those who use machines have to
acquire skills of machines and thus hearts of
machines… Then my spirit becomes restless
and loses Tao. (Chuang Tzu, Ch. 12)
Dewey: The senses [of teachers and students] are
then regarded as a kind of mysterious conduit
through which information is conducted from
the external world into the mind; they are
spoken of as gateways and avenues of
knowledge. (1966/1916, 142)
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This will to control reflected in our schooling system, can hold both teachers and students
“standing reserves” as mediums and containers of knowledge, as Dewey notes in his comment.
Even the organs and senses of teachers and students are reduced to mechanical functions,
specifically, the memorizing or reproducing functions. Heidegger, however, does not think we
should ask the question, “What are we to do?” Regarding this “greatest danger” of modern
technology, this question “still tempts us to think that human activity can counter or master this
danger”: the answer to that question is “to ponder, to recollect, to reflect, to question, to think, to
prepare, to wait” (Heidegger, in Bernstein, 1992, 115).15
15 Bernstein critiques that “Heidegger seduces us into thinking that the only possible response (the highest
possibility) to the supreme danger of Gestell [enframing] is poetic revealing” – the Heideggerian bias to “displace
praxis by thinking” (126-127). In contrast, Bernstein thinks the highest possibility might be “action which is
exhibited in the public space of political debate, action that presupposes the human condition of plurality and
natality” (127). Bernstein agrees with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s argument that Heidegger is guilty of “‘a terrible
intellectual hubris’ when he leads us to think that the only proper (authentic) response to the supreme danger is to
prepare ourselves to watch over unconcealment” (in Bernstein, 128). For more on unconcealment, see Wrathall’s
“Heidegger and Unconcealment” (2010).
As for Bernstein’s criticism of Heidegger’s ideas, I agree and disagree. I agree with Bernstein that we need the
practical wisdom of praxis but disagree with his critique of Heidegger’s “thinking,” especially Heidegger’s
seemingly passive merely watching not acting over unconcealment of being or truth. In the beginning of his “Letter
on Humanism,” Heidegger writes, “Thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or
because it is applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks” (217). At first sight, this thinking seems to be passive
inaction, but as it actively engages with “what remains reserved and in store” in beings for possibilities of “not yet”
(437), it is in essence prudent and reflexive action. I do not think Heidegger’s taking this thinking as the highest
form of action is “a terrible intellectual hubris.”
In fact, Heidegger has answered Bernstein’s critique in the Spiegel interview (1981/1966) as he is asked several
times by the interviewer how philosophy can influence our actuality.  When he is asked again about the transmission
of insights into actualization, Heidegger says, “I know nothing about how this thought has an ‘effect.’ It may be, too,
that the way of thought today may lead one to remain silent in order to protect this thought from becoming
cheapened within a year. It may also be that it needs 300 years in order to have an ‘effect’” (60). All of his answers
suggest that even if thinking has an “effect,” it is never in a causal way.  What this thinking is against is not real
action or the praxis as suggested by Bernstein, but is of unthoughtful thinking/actions. Bernstein, of course, is
critical of what he believes were Heidegger’s nonactions regarding Jews when he was rector at Freiberg during the
Nazi years. The literature on this period of Heidegger’s life is voluminous and contentious.
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In the framework of modern technology as “enframing,” the strong sense of “waiting” in
the non-casual way Heidegger advocates, through immanent reflections in meditative thinking,
echoes the essential spirit of inaction in Taoism. Inaction is one of the most important words in
Taoism, next to Tao. They are often put together as the “Way/Tao of inaction.” In Ch. 2 of “Tao
Te Ching,” Lao Tzu says, “Tao inacts and
therefore acts everywhere.” For Lao Tzu, this
inaction is not a passive non-doing, but careful
and reflective undoing. As suggested in the
conversation box by Lao Tzu, the sage “inacts”
to let everything grow without instigating it.
Interestingly, “growth” is also one of the
favorite metaphors in Dewey. Dewey’s
statement “Growth is not something done to
them [students]; it is something they do,” relates
well to Lao Tzu’s saying of growth “coming through him [sage] rather than of him.” This sense
of “letting grow” disappears, according to Heidegger, in the “hierarchical and authoritarian”
educational institutions in which “the student is subjected to the discipline of the teacher.”
Heidegger points out that the analogy between teaching and production comes from the
essence of modern technology, “techne” as “enframing” or the establishment of what is
organized and finished rather than the revealing or unconcealment of truth in art. As Heidegger
says, “techne” reduces education to the instrumental. The greatest danger of this education is the
same as that of modern technology, the will to will, master or control. When teachers try to
control students’ learning, students are thus subjected to the order of teachers; teachers, too, are
Heidegger: What becomes clear is that the
university as pedagogical community is
constructed to be hierarchical and
authoritarian: the student is subjected to
the discipline of the teacher. Implicit in all
of this, of course, is that the representation
of the teacher is borrowed from techne
and its relations of production. It is
precisely this reduction of education to the
instrumental, by analogy with techne, that
is the source of everything awry with the
university today. (2002/1945, 35)
Dewey: Growth is not something done to them
[students]; it is something they do.
(1966/1916, 42)
Lao Tzu: The sage inacts….Therefore,
everything grows by coming through him
rather than of him. (Tao Te Ching, Ch. 2)
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dominated by this will to control, and thus cannot respond to the lived calls of each unique face
of their students.16 If Heidegger is correct, that we can “do” nothing to “counter or master” this
danger, how can we challenge this education as “enframing”? When I ponder this question, a
comment I heard before from one student teacher about her own instructor jumps into my mind.
The student complained that the instructor of her educational foundations class taught her only
“how to think, rather than how to teach.” Are thinking and teaching totally separate from each
other as suggested in that complaint? Before turning to that question, I’d like to first explore
Heidegger’s thoughts on thinking, one of the most significant topics in his later works.
In his “Discourse on Thinking,” Heidegger (1966/1955) argues that thoughtlessness has
now become the symbol of our age and he criticizes that the world now becomes open to
calculative thinking which always computes with the intention of serving particular purposes to
guarantee certain results while never stopping or (re)collecting itself. 17 This description of
calculative thinking sounds so familiar to me, as it resonates with the learning experience in my
undergraduate teacher education program in China. “Teaching Methods” was the name of several
of the most important courses in my major of education, and I had been trained quite well in the
linear order of teaching in both the “Tyler Rationale” and Herbart’s “Five Steps.” These methods
were calculated carefully from setting up the objectives – often in behavioral terms – at the
beginning of the course to the evaluation at the end, assessing the achievement of the
objectives.18 Even now I remember clearly a former professor stating in the first class that,
16 For more of this lived call to students’ faces, see Aoki (2005).
17 Instead, Heidegger (1966) encourages us to look forward to “meditative thinking” which “contemplates the
meaning which reigns in everything that is” (46).  He says, “Meditative thinking demands of us not to cling one-
sidedly to a single idea, nor to run down a one-track course of ideas” (53). Only this meditative thinking for
Heidegger is real thinking.
18 It is worth noting in this frame that the evaluation is always on how well the objectives were achieved, not on the
quality of the objectives themselves. The question as to whether the objectives were worth doing was not asked. The
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“Teaching is a method. We have to learn how to predict, plan and guarantee our students’
learning.” Then he began the class with a concrete classroom example, lecturing why and how to
“guide” students’ learning by setting up objectives. Interestingly, I read the same classroom
example again 12 years later when I reviewed the national textbooks for teacher education
programs in Chinese normal colleges and universities (Su, 2009). The textbook tells a story: after
dividing his 5th graders into two groups before a field trip to a farm, a teacher asks one group to
observe plants and the other animals. After the class comes back to school, the teacher asks both
groups to write two observation reports, one on plants and the other on animals. Unsurprisingly,
the “plant” group does poorly on “animals” and vice versa.
In reading this example, used by both my professor and the textbook to justify the
necessity and importance of prescribing particular objectives for teaching any class, I read the
opposite message – it is the predetermined objectives by teachers that restrict and obstruct
possibilities of learning in not only students but teachers. The “natural” growth advocated by
both Lao Tzu and Dewey was violently impeded.  When teachers try to control—via the way—
the method of teaching-as-telling in order to guarantee students’ learning, both teachers and
students are also, at the same time, controlled by the way from which they cannot run away.
When I reflect on the training I have received on “teaching methods,” I think its
fundamental problem is in considering teaching as merely a “method” of “doing,” or specifically
a “method” of “growing students” toward particular directions. If teaching is only an umbrella
term for the steps, procedures, strategies or tricks of teaching, the complaint upon the teacher
educator who teaches students only “how to think, rather than how to teach” can be justified. As
Heidegger (1971/1959) claims, “Thinking is not [just a] means to gain knowledge” (70), I
suggest teaching is not just a method to transfer knowledge. Beside the analogy between
American critique of this behaviorist frame can be found in Kliebard (1995).
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teaching and modern technology in Heidegger’s critique of schooling, I find another analogy
between teaching and thinking: like genuine thinking, genuine teaching “does not wish and is
not able to predict the future” (1993/1966, 437).
Heidegger says this thinking is “content with awakening a readiness in man for a
possibility whose contour remains obscure, whose coming remains uncertain,” so we must “first
learn what remains reserved and in store… what it is to get involved” (436). Thinking “prepares
its own transformation in this learning” (436). He calls this thinking preparatory thinking (437).
He says to his wife, “what is essential never ‘exerts an effect’ but only ‘is’ provided that
something of its own kind comes to meet it from a deeper origin. Yet we cannot plan this, but
only wait in silent readiness” (2008/1939, 160). If philosophers as genuine thinkers cannot offer
even indirect help to reality in any casual way, how can teachers teach their students for the
future? My response is that teachers have to en-teach. Like genuine but “inactive” thinking, en-
teaching has to “wait in silent readiness” rather than “teach efficiently.”
Through en-teaching one “learn[s] what remains reserved and in store for it, what it is to
get involved in”; one does not act, but watches patiently. To use the metaphor of “growth” in
Dewey and Lao Tzu, the careful learning of the seeds, soils, climates and even bugs in the garden
allows the gardener to see a readiness for possibilities “whose contour remains obscure, whose
coming remains uncertain.” Then the gardener can gently awaken this readiness which is full of
potential for future transformations. In this sense, en-teaching does not “exert an effect” on
students or students’ learning, but waits for something that can “be” provided for students’
growth “from a deeper origin.” This waiting sounds inactive, especially as what it waits for is not
a concrete “result,” but a “readiness” for possibilities of what is not yet. In returning to the
question of objectives and concern about how students can learn without specific objectives, it is
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true the “plant” group in the previous example, observes plants well, as the “animal” group
observes animals well. All students’ visions, however, are confined or restricted by the preset
objectives of the particular group to which they belong. The students interested in “cows” on the
farm but assigned to the “plant” group are out of luck. According to Kliebard (1995), many
educators have been “so completely socialized into the belief that the starting point for virtually
any educational activity is a clearly stated objective or set of objectives” and forgotten that
objectives can “emerge out of the educational activities themselves rather than prior to them”
(82). In other words, can we just “engage in an educational activity for good reasons that have
nothing to with objectives” (82)? Can the students be allowed to take a stroll of the farm by
themselves, running, roaring and watching, and then form their own groups with the teacher as a
wise aid to help them on the things they want to explore?19 Here, I hear the powerful call of
Emerson, “Respect the child. Be not too much his parent. Trespass not on his solitude” (in
Dewey, 1966/1916, 52).
Like Lao Tzu’s sage, en-teaching acts through inactions by “awakening a readiness.”
Joan Stambaugh quotes the poem “Sils Maria” (Friedrich Nietzsche) in discussing Heidegger’s
thinking as waiting:
Here I sat waiting, waiting – yet for nothing,
Beyond good and evil, enjoying now the light,
Now the shadows, all only a game,
All sea, all noon, all time without a goal (Nietzsche, 1986/1981, 134)
Nietzsche’s waiting has gone “beyond good and evil” in enjoying the game of “light” and
“shadow” “without a goal.” Unlike the will to put everything under control, en-teaching waits,
19 This does not mean the teacher’s role is reduced to the same level as that of the student – “The teacher loses the
position of external boss or dictator but takes on that of leader of group activities” (Dewey, 1963/1938, 59). Dewey
thinks teachers should draw on their past experience and expertise to help students interact with subject materials
from students’ present interests, needs and capacities and thus to see in which direction an educative experience
might be leading. What teachers use to guide students in teaching is not their external control from above, but,
according to Dewey, “the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an
opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a responsibility” (56, emphasis added).
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never wills – it does not constantly predict, plan, assess and compute both teaching and learning.
The “enjoying” of “now the light, now the shadows” brings me back to the previous explorations
of the struggle between light and darkness, empty and full, in the game or play of (un)truth.  As
this waiting has no goal, it becomes void or empty – it is “for nothing” and at the same time,
therefore, can be “for everything” – a generative site of possibilities thus emerges. In this sense,
en-teaching does not directly teach by intruding into students’ growth, but acts as “a vigorous
fragrance” of “a wheatfield on a summer’s night.”20
En-Teaching as the “Noiseless Ringing of Stillness”
Another key word in Heidegger’s complex thinking is language as he states that his
reflections on language and Being have influenced his path of thinking from early on.
Heidegger (1971/1959)  believes “language is the house of Being” (63); he argues that to say
means “to make appear, set free, that is, to offer and extend what we call World, lighting and
concealing it” (93). In other words, saying is showing, which at the same time unconceals and
conceals. Furthermore, Heidegger thinks the word “holds and sustains a thing in its being,” (65)
rather than acting “like a grasp that fastens upon the things already in being and held to be in
being” (68). In this sense, the word or language inscribes rather than represents being.
20 In quoting Nietzsche that “Our thinking should have a vigorous fragrance, like a wheatfield on a summer’s night,”
Heidegger (1971/1959) sighs, “How many of us today still have the senses for that fragrance?” (70).
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While the essence of modern technology, “enframing,” ordains a formalized language
which can model and adjust man “into the technological-calculative creature, a step-by-step
process through which he surrenders his ‘natural language,’” Heidegger (1993/1959) says that
speech becomes information as securely established (420-421). Therefore, man forgets “speaking
is not simultaneously a hearing, but is such in advance” (Heidegger, 411, emphasis original). As
the enframing makes speaking merely speaking rather than listening or responding, speaking
turns into monologue. This is one of the major
critiques of teaching-as-telling – the speaking or
monologue of the teacher dominating the classroom.
The teacher’s voice is the only one to listen to.
Students are then expected to be receptive of the
“uniform” information sent from the teacher’s
monologue, no matter how “weary” and “bored” this “monotonous” speaking is. Dewey teases,
“To keep the eyes on the book and the ears open to the teacher’s words is a mysterious source of
intellectual grace.” Along with teachers’ monologues, students’ silence is one of the prime virtues
of traditional schools. This required silence of students is not only necessitated by, but
complementary to, the speaking-as-telling of the teacher. Both work together for the ultimate aim
of “the accumulation of knowledge” in students; however, Lao Tzu claims, this learning “reduces
the Tao.” When I considered this statement in Lao Tzu along with Heidegger and Dewey in the
conversation box, three critical incidents of my past school experience came to mind.
One of the rules that was deeply imprinted in my mind since kindergarten is: “Never ever
interject in class without permission.” I knew throughout K-12 that I, like my daughter Tracy,
must be a good listener if I want to be a good student. When I became a student teacher, my
Heidegger: The monotonous brings
weariness, and the weary and bored
find only what is uniform. (1981, 70)
Dewey: To keep the eyes on the book and
the ears open to the teacher’s words is
a mysterious source of intellectual
grace.  (1966/1916, 142)
Lao Tzu: The accumulation of knowledge
through learning reduces the Tao.
(Tao Te Ching, Ch. 41)
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Chinese mentor once had the following conversation with me after she observed my intern
teaching: “Jie, do you find that you say nothing whenever you write on the blackboard?” “That
might be true. Is that a problem?” “Of course, a BIG problem.” “Why?” “Because this creates a
deadly silence in class. Your students will not know what to do. They can do nothing except
watch you write on the blackboard. That’s a waste of time.” Since then I began to consciously
have the habit of continuing to talk while writing on the blackboard, turning on the projector,
opening PowerPoint, and collecting students’ work in class. While the educational foundation
class I was teaching discussed Freire’s “The Pedagogy of the Oppressed,” one girl talked about
her geography class, “We call the professor Killer Miller. She is so talkative and never stops. I
know there’s much useful information in her talking, but while she just keeps on talking, talking,
talking… How we hope she can shut up!”
Now when I look back to the three incidents, they constitute, in some sense, a brief but
complete story and history, from my learning the “virtue” of listening as a student, to the “virtue”
of speaking/telling as a teacher, and finally students’ resistance to both as I become a teacher
educator. While students’ silence before the teacher’s speaking is required and valued in
traditional direct teaching, my mentor teacher uses the word, “deadly,” to describe the silence of
students before that of the teacher, for it is assumed that “students will not know what to do.”
That means students can only follow the teacher’s lead – without the telling of the teacher,
students can go nowhere. The point is that while the silence of students is appreciated, that of the
teacher is discouraged. This emphasis on speaking over silence, teaching as doing over undoing,
is against the spirit of Tao, especially as Lao Tzu argues, “the greatest sound is silence” (Ch. 41).
Furthermore, the achievement of Tao through inaction is totally different and even contrary to the
accumulation of knowledge as information. For Lao Tzu, it is unsurprising that this form of
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teaching and learning is the reduction of Tao.
Looking to the future, what intrigues me at the end of the third incident is what will
happen if the teacher is “shut up.” Under
“enframing,” Heidegger thinks the greatest
danger of language “demands of us a telling
silence as regards the propriative, way-making
movement in the essence of language” (424,
emphasis added). Here silence refers to that of
the speaker, not the listener. Since “silence” is
usually taken as the antonym of “speaking,”
how is silence related to the essence of
language or speaking? In the conversation box,
Chuang Tzu answers, “He sees in the darkest
dark, he hears where there is no sound.” The
poetic metaphor given by Heidegger might explain how one listens in silence.
The metaphor of poetry is often used by Heidegger in discussing language. Heidegger
(1971/1959) says when the poet writes, he experiences “an authority, a dignity of the word than
which nothing vaster and loftier can be thought,” as he is “trusted and entrusted as poet” by the
word – “The poet experiences his poetic calling as a call to the word as the source, the bourn of
Being” (66). This extraordinary example might sound strange to many people. How can the word
or language have its own “authority” and “dignity” toward the “trusted and entrusted” writer or
speaker? Here language is living in an interactive relationship with humans. Once humans hear
that “poetic calling as call to the word as the source, the bourn of Being,” they are obliged to
Heidegger: We keep secret only what we
know. The poet does not keep the names a
secret. He does not know them. He admits it
himself in that one verse which rings like abasso ostinato through all the songs:
Wherein you hang – you do not know.
The experience of this poet with the word
passes into darkness, and even remains
veiled itself. We must leave it so; but merely
by thinking about the poetic experience in
this way, we leave it in the neighborhood of
thinking. (1971/1959, 79, emphasis added)
Chuang Tzu: He sees in the darkest dark, he
hears where there is no sound. In the midst
of darkness, he alone sees the dawn; in the
midst of the soundless, he alone hears
harmony. (Chuang Tzu, Ch. 12)




respond.  In this sense, it is not that the poet writes poems but that the poet is called by the word
to write. Therefore, the poet does not possess the word or verse he writes down – he even cannot
“understand” it – “Wherein you hang, you do not know.”
This is why Heidegger says, “The experience of this poet with the word passes into
darkness, and even remains veiled itself.” This darkness does not mean that the word is
completely concealed to the poet, but implies the word is unconcealed to the poet as he is called
to write while at the same time concealed as beyond the knowing of the poet. It is not a despair
of the failure of control, but a call or claim for the poet to live with(in) this darkness: “We must
leave it so; but merely by thinking about the poetic experience in this way, we leave it in the
neighborhood of thinking.” Through this thinking about the poetic experience of the darkness,
we know we do not or even cannot know. Respecting without violently intruding into this
darkness of unknowing, therefore, we can see the dawn “in the midst of darkness” and hear
harmony “in the midst of the soundless.” In Chinese, the word “harmony” is used in the sense of
“lived” and “dynamical” going together, as in music, rather than fixed or static unity and
conformity, as soldiers walking at the same pace. This harmony lives in the intricate play
between darkness and light, concealment and unconcealment, speaking and silence. This
harmonious “hearing” is different from the passive “listening” criticized by Dewey in the
conversation box. It does not depend on speaking; rather, it speaks through genuine thinking,
knowing through unknowing.
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En-teaching calls for this hearing of harmony in
silence, or using Heidegger’s phrase in the conversation
box, “the noiseless ringing of the stillness.” Heidegger
(1971/1959) explains that this “ringing of stillness” is
“the soundless gathering call by which Saying moves the
world-relation in its way” (92). The Heideggerian focus
on “still” or “stillness” in language, which appears as
early as in “Being and Time,” echoes Taoism here. Heidegger has asked Hsiao, a Taoist
philosopher, to inscribe two lines of Ch. 15 from “Tao Te Ching” in Chinese characters as
decoration in his house and later translated them in one of his letters to Hsiao, “Who can be still
and out of stillness and through it move something on to the Way so that it comes to shine forth?
Who is able through making still to bring something into Being? The Tao of heaven” (Hsiao,
1987, 103). This implies the “wordless teaching” advocated by Lao Tzu in the conversation box.
While the teaching as the telling of uniform truth is common in today’s daily classrooms, this
teaching without words rings silently in the soundless darkness between speaking and hearing.
Like the poet, the teacher is called to speak and teach but does not possess what to teach and
whom to speak to. In other words, the teacher is not in unitary control of subject materials and
students. Similarly, Dewey maintains, “Education is not an affair of ‘telling’ and being told.”
While the speaking in teaching-as-telling speaks only what the teacher already
understands and forces students to listen only, I suggest en-teaching teaches wordlessly through a
“speaking silence.” I create the phrase “speaking silence,” for I think both teachers and students
are “silenced” in the telling of the traditional direct teaching. When the teacher speaks not as a
response, that is not as “a reply, a saying that goes to encounter, and listens” (Heidegger,
Heidegger: Silence corresponds to
the noiseless ringing of stillness,
the stillness of the saying that
propriates and shows.
(1993/1959, 420)
Lao Tzu: Therefore, I know the
good of inaction. Few things in
the world can be better than the
wordless teaching and inaction.
(Tao Te Ching, Ch. 43)
Dewey: Education is not an affair
of “telling” and being told.
(1966/1916, 38)
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1993/1959, 418), s/he does not speak in a Heideggerian sense. For example, when the teacher
asks students if they have any questions as for what s/he has said in class, s/he is merely
checking if students listen and understand well her/his tellings – no genuine speaking or listening
occurs.  While the ears of students are reduced to listening, the mouths speaking only what can
be validated or affirmed by the teacher, they do not speak either. This is the real “deadly silence”
that we need to be scared of – often the teacher speaks forcefully and students listen carefully in
the classroom, but essentially no one is speaking or listening. The source of this tragedy, we
forget, is that “man [also] speaks by being silent” (Heidegger, 1993/1951, 52, 381).
In this sense, the “speaking silence” of en-teaching speaks through silence. Max van
Manen (1991) thinks silence has the “power of stillness” in education: it involves
a quiet trustful acceptance (while not interrogating or probing the child’s mood),
or a resolute turning away (while not really leaving), or a quietly passing over
(while not in any way neglecting), or an unobtrusive lingering presence (while not
being demonstrative or purposive about being there for the child in any way
neglecting). (177-178)
A speaking silence becomes a “stepping back” in which both the teacher and students are
granted opportunities to have broader visions of what is encountered and to dwell in “the
neighborhood of thinking.” As they dwell in this “neighborhood of thinking,” both teachers and
students do not rush to speak but hold on and wait in silence. They genuinely think in a way in
which “thinking is a thanking” (Heidegger, 1993/1959, 425), rather than regretting or despairing:
teachers and students appreciate and are thankful for their “hanging”21 and “unknowing” in that
darkness. Rather than willing the darkness through endless noisy speaking, en-teaching ponders
upon the darkness through silence. This silence is a surrender but not a giving up. It comes from
the tensioned relation between teacher, student and subject material. For Heidegger, the silence
21 Here it refers back to one of Heidegger’s quotations in conversation box, “ Wherein you hang – you do not know.”
(1971/1959, 79).
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speaks not as holding, grasping, catching, pushing or pulling, but as reaching, extending, calling,
receiving and welcoming.
Conclusion
Heidegger, Dewey and Lao Tzu live in quite different historical periods and places, but
their insightful thoughts, in some sense, resonate with each other. As Heidegger has read and
even translated Lao Tzu’s masterpiece, “Tao Te Ching,” many of his phenomenological works
speak to the spirit of Tao in Lao Tzu.  This chapter has explored possibilities of en-teaching as a
clearing between truth and untruth, the call of the Way of Tao as waying, “wait[ing] in silent
readiness,” and the “noiseless ringing of stillness” from the complex conversations between
these three great thinkers. These possibilities are not independent or separate from each other, but
intertwined with each other. The “empty” clearing, reflective thinking in waiting, and silent
listening in stillness are explored as different ways of en-teaching, all placed against
“enframing,” the will to control, present in traditional direct teaching. In brief, en-teaching is





In this final chapter, I will pull together threads connecting stories and themes in
this dissertation, a research project to develop another way to think about teaching, which
I have called en-teaching. In this chapter, I wish to present a more in-depth picture of en-
teaching. Two related issues have fueled my passion to develop the concept of en-
teaching. I introduce this with a story:
“You Are an Excellent, Aggressive Teacher.”
As revealed in Chapter one, my long unsettling journey in the development of en-
teaching began from my first intern teaching experience in a middle school in Shanghai
thirteen years ago. After I surrendered to my mentor’s pressure to be teaching-as-telling,
to push my students to learn for testing, she happily complimented me by reporting on
my evaluation form, “You are an excellent, aggressive teacher.” At that time, I wondered,
“What does the word, ‘aggressive,’ mean in teaching?” “Does it mean that I should
dominate my students to guarantee certain results?” “Do I always have to be aggressive
to be an excellent teacher?”…. These were confusing, burning questions for me. I could
not figure out the answers but the disappearing passion for learning in my students’ bored
eyes and their looks of resignation made me feel uncomfortable with this aggressive way
of teaching. Teaching so conceived is an act of violence. Is there not a better way to teach?
A second issue related to the first is based on my observation that teaching-as-
narrating/telling is so entrenched in the public school systems in both America and China,
that it is seen not simply as a teaching method, but as the only way to teach. Even now,
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many national textbooks for teacher education programs in Chinese normal universities
and colleges insist that “narrating/telling method” is the most important one in teaching.
While acknowledging the possible shortcomings of this method, researchers insist this is
not only the oldest and easiest but also the most efficient, practical and thus widely
applied teaching method (Shao, 1997; C. Wang, 2005; Chu & Pan, 2009). Many of these
researchers try to better this teaching method by paying more attention to students’
learning; however, in reality, their attempts continue to justify teaching-as-
narrating/telling—always recommending ways of doing it better. Teaching-as-telling
understood as teaching, is synonymous with instruction, and it defines schooling. It is like
an elephant in the room – never itself addressed as a problem. It is never reconceived in
terms of relations between and among teachers, students, curriculum and culture.
“Can There Be a Different Way of Teaching?”
This question immediately brings me back to the passionate, perhaps overzealous,
statement by my first education professor in China regarding teaching as enlightenment,
teaching the truth. In reviewing selected literature critical of “teaching-as-telling” in
America and China, I suggest in chapter two that in traditional direct teaching of “truth,”
teaching is reduced to a method to instruct students to gain knowledge under the shining
Sun of Truth, a concept criticized by Heidegger as “brighter than one thousand suns.”
Since I engage with the question of truth related to teaching and since the question “can
there be a different way” “assumes the greatest urgency in Heidegger’s thought” (Sallis,
20), chapter three focuses on Heidegger’s complex explorations of (un)truth in clearings
between brightness and darkness along with his concept of “let learn” through always
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“being-in-the-world.” Graduate school readings, especially in Heidegger, Lao Tzu, and
Dewey, have aided me in my struggle to find an alternative to teaching-as-telling.
While I am proposing an alternative way to conceive teaching, an alternative to
traditional direct teaching, I am at the same time proposing that en-teaching can be
incorporated into any curriculum, is complementary to any curriculum, and can be
integrated with direct teaching. The implied dichotomy set up by my referring to an
alternative is not to suggest throwing out traditional direct teaching or instruction in favor
of en-teaching; rather, it is to point out that each has different fundamental assumptions
and philosophical perspectives about the act of teaching. Therefore, as Lyotard notes
about post-modernism being a re-writing of modernity rather than a rejection, I am
similarly re-writing teaching-as-telling. Of course, there are occasions that call for
traditional direct instruction. In the poststructural sense, however, I am opening the
concept of teaching, i.e., what it means to teach, to provide new ways of thinking about
teaching. The profoundly different fundamental assumptions and philosophical basis of
en-teaching are formed from my interconnected readings of Heidegger on (un)truth,
being, language and modern technology, of Lao Tzu on emptiness, inaction and Tao/way,
and of Dewey on growth, immaturity, and experience, as shown in chapter four. Drawn
from the complex conversations I created among these three great thinkers living in quite
different historical periods and places, chapter four develops possibilities of en-teaching
as waitful thinking, awake in “silent readiness” for a “noiseless ringing” attuned to calls
of the way[ing] of Tao.
Few in curriculum studies, draw on Heidegger’s writings, Molly Quinn (1997)
being a notable exception. Recently, Michael Peters (2002) and Iain Thomson (2005)
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seek to explicate Heidegger’s philosophy related to education. In my research, developing
the concept of en-teaching, however, my purpose is to bring forward from Heidegger the
meaning of teaching and the role of teachers. En-teaching is different than anything
proposed by Peters or Thomson, primarily because it focuses on the act of classroom
teaching.
In regard to classroom teaching, en-teaching is being-in-relation – “to let learn.”
Since teaching is being with humans, this being-in-relation does not only mean the
relation between the act and content of teaching or learning but also the relation between
teaching and learning. Heidegger (1993/1936) argues, “Teaching therefore does not mean
anything else than to let the others learn, that is, to bring one another to learning.
Teaching is more difficult than learning; for only he who can truly learn – and only as
long as he can do it – can truly teach” (275). In this sense, teaching is not the
determination of learning but letting learning happen – the teacher is not the dictator but
helper or facilitator of his students. This is why Heidegger (1993/1951-52) writes that
“The teacher must be capable of being more teachable than the apprentices” (380). While
the teacher learns through teaching, students also can teach through learning. This is quite
different from the traditional linear logic of “the teacher teaches and then students learn.”
Heidegger (1993/1951-52) claims, “To learn means to make everything we do answer to
whatever essentials address us at a given time” (380). En-teaching needs to present
evocative work to students for their critical responses. En-teaching, unlike instructing,
opposes to the mechanical transferring of knowledge/truth from teacher to student in an
authoritative top-down relationship. Whenever the teacher says this is the right answer,
that cuts off learning.
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Second, en-teaching means to improvise, to “create your own music on the spot.”
One day after I watched Tracy finish her daily piano excise, I went out of the room to get
a drink for her. When I back, I saw Tracy closed her piano “Lesson Book” and played
with the keys freely. “Which song are you playing, Tracy?” “Oh, that’s my own song.”
“Your song?” I frowned. “Yes, Mommy. I’m improvising.” I then smiled, “Do you know
what it means to improvise?” “Of course I know. To improvise means to ‘create your own
music at the spot.’ Ms. Kate said it.” At that time, this metaphorical meaning of
improvisation left me in thinking for a long time. As the proliferation of “method”
courses such as “math methods” and “English methods” in many teacher education
programs assumes teaching is merely a method to instruct students to gain accepted
knowledge or truth, en-teaching as improvisation regards teaching as an “art” rather than
a “craft” or “technique.” It requires the teacher to “create my own music at the spot” and
thus be willing to flow with the complex dynamics of classroom teaching and learning. In
other words, the responsibility of the teacher is to respond to every lived call from
students carefully in emergent situations.
Third, en-teaching promotes the “collateral learning” of “enduring attitudes of
likes and dislikes” as advocated by Dewey (1963/1938, 48, emphasis added). Dewey
thinks this learning is much more significant than the actual content of learning.
Unfortunately, few of us as teachers have genuinely realized this. This reminds me of a
television interview I watched in China. When the winner of the gold medal of the
international Olympic math competition in that year was asked why he rejected all
admission offers and scholarships from university math departments, including almost all
Ivy League universities in U.S., finally choosing psychology as the major, he replied,
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after an extremely long pause: “Because I hate math.” What an astonishing answer! No
matter how successful one’s education is in training students to acquire highly
sophisticated knowledge and skills in a particular subject, it is still a failure if it cannot
cultivate students’ interest and passion in this discipline.
Fourth but not the least importantly, en-teaching can be cultivated through
reflective experience in a recursive loop. This is how I learn from my experiences.
Reflecting on my past two unsettling journeys of teaching in China and America
produces questions about the teaching of truth deep in my heart. I gradually built up my
critical, reflexive thoughts on teaching through playing with the ideas of a great variety of
educational scholars and with their different conceptualizations of teaching. In this
critical self study or examination, I try to talk to myself in different teaching modes in
multi-I conversations. When I re-visit myself in such a critical reflective journey and look
forward to the future in the present, I can experience my growth (using the metaphor
from Dewey) in a recursive loop.
“What Does En-Teaching Mean to Me as I Face My Class on Monday
Morning?”
Friends who have read my dissertation, and inquiry project on “en-teaching,”
have often made a similar response: “Your conceptualization and writing on en-teaching
is poetic and appealing, but what does it mean to a practicing teacher?” My philosophy
professor who brought Heidegger to me commented, “I appreciate your understanding
and use of Heidegger in the field of philosophy, but wonder how your education people
will think about it. They might question what this ‘en-teaching’ as ‘way-giving,’
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Figure 5.2           (-3)*4=?
‘emptiness,’ ‘waiting,’ and ‘speaking silence,’ means for a regular teacher.” In short, the
practical question is “What does en-teaching mean to me, a practicing teaching, as I face
my class on Monday morning?”
To answer that question, I wish to tell the following story. One story I often share
with my students, future elementary teachers, to help them see how en-teaching can make
sense for pre- and in-service teachers. In a 5th grade
math class, students were working on the question,
“(-3)*4” (Zhang, 2008). While most students got the
answer, “-12,” one student stammered, “I th-h-h-ink
it should be 9.” “Why?” The teacher became curious
and allowed the boy to write down the process on the blackboard. The boy then drew two
number lines to explain to the class, “Since ‘3*4’ means to make 4 jumps of 3 steps on
the number line which finally reaches 12, ‘(-3)*4’ means to make 4 jumps of 3 steps from
‘-3’ which finally reaches 9.” Before the boy came to the blackboard, many students
whispered in class, “That’s incorrect.” “I cannot imagine how he got that answer.” “Ha-ha,
let’s see how he got that wrong.” During the boy’s explanation, however, the classroom
became more and more quiet.  After he finished with a blushed face in front of the class,
the teacher clapped, “Great work!” and turned to the class, “I will give you 12 minutes to
discuss in groups your thoughts of his way of solving this question and then come back to
whole class discussions.” The following discussions were wonderful while they debated
on how many jumps there should be, which directions the jumps should take, where the
starting points of the jumps begin…
After the class ended, the teacher admitted to the observing researcher that when
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she asked the boy to show the class how he got his answer of “9,” she planned to
“correct” his “mistake” to keep the class on the “right” track; however, after the boy
explained the way he approached to the question, she was struck “dumb,” right in the
moment, and did not know how to react, so she let the class have group discussions to
give both the class and herself time to seriously reflect on his unique solution.
By conventional mathematical standards, the boy’s answer of “9” to the question,
“(-3)*4,” is “untrue,” or as commented by his classmates, “incorrect.” Returning to the
passionate and ambitious argument of my former professor of “teaching truth to and thus
enlighten our students,” I wonder, if the teacher had followed the suggestion of Comenius
that s/he “brings into existence nothing that is useless, or destroys such an object if it be
accidentally produced,” such “untruth” would have been violently erased or wiped out in
our daily classrooms.
It is, however, true that the student’s “unique” way to approach the question
cannot be easily labeled as “wrong.” Indeed, the student’s way can open up a discussion
as to the role of zero, the nature of “a starting place,” working with negative numbers, etc.
The complex interplay between truth and untruth emerges here. As the boy’s initial
exploration unconceals and at the same time conceals the truth of that math question, his
way evokes the not-yet possibility of other ways in both students including himself and
the teacher. Finally, what matters in that dynamical class conversations is not what is the
right answer of “(-3)*4” but how to mathematically understand and engage with that
question. Fortunately, the teacher heard the call in his special way of dealing with the
question and thus nicely gave way to him and other students in the class.
This is the en-teaching I advocate in this dissertation and suggest to my students
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as future school teachers. As a teacher educator, I think most current teaching in
“methods” courses puts too much emphasis on teaching as a method of helping students
achieve “true” knowledge rather than teaching as exploring being in relation. The
personal statement I put under my name on Moodle, an online communication site of my
class, is a quotation from Galileo Galilei, “We cannot teach people anything; we can only
help them discover it within themselves.” If education is not simply a process of
“correcting” students to develop in the “right” way, but to “let” them “grow” in personal
ways, the teacher has to give way to ways of “flow” in the classroom dynamics.
This conceptualization of en-teaching correspondingly requires an en-teaching
curriculum for pre-service teachers. I suggest the first thing a tentative en-teaching
teacher education program can do is to teach student teachers how to learn from, rather
than how to teach, their students – how to patiently listen to, rather than, forcefully tell so
called truth to children. In other words, student teachers have to learn to step off from that
“elevated platform” in classrooms to learn that teaching is more of “stepping back,” and
“letting learn,” rather than “aggressive invading.”
Teaching as “Releasement”: Awakening En-Teaching
Sit down and be quiet; face front because all knowledge is at the front; be
obedient.
-- William Ayers, 1995, 7
While I was struggling with writing my dissertation on “en-teaching,” I squeezed
in time to make Tracy’s school lunch for her award as Student of the Month. During
lunch, the principal asked students, “Why do you think you are selected as the Student of
the Month?” Tracy immediately raised her hand and the principal smiled, “OK, let’s
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begin with the pre-kindergarteners. Tracy, why are you selected?”  “Because I am a good
listener and good reader.” “Great! Listening ears are important in school. I’m proud of
you!” Tracy’s little face shone as all people applauded for her “good” and “natural”
answer. What first jumped into my mind at that time was not the critique of the “teaching-
as-telling” or “students’ passive listening” in my dissertation chapters, but an imaginary
scene in a jail, “Why do you think you are selected as Prisoner of the Month?” “Because I
am a good listener.” “Great! Listening ears are important in jail. I’m proud of you!” I say
to myself, “See, there is a reason why jail is often taken as a simile to school.”
When I asked my students why they chose the major of teaching, one of the most
frequent answers I have received is, “This is one of the few careers that can make people
listen to me carefully.” Honestly, teaching as telling truth to students, in some sense, can
make the teacher feel as good as a god in the shrine. As critiqued in the beginning
quotation by Ayers and as I discussed in chapter two, this emphasis on students’ listening
ear toward the teacher’s speaking/telling mouth can be traced back to the Johann Amos
Comenius in the western history of education, who is often considered the father of
modern education (Gundem, 1992; Hamilton, 1990 & 1992). In his masterpiece, “The
Great Didactic,” Comenius (1896/1632) compares the role of the teacher to that of the
sun. He first lists the characteristics of the functions of the sun as:
It gives light to all things with the same rays; it covers all things with
moisture by the same processes of evaporation and condensation; it causes
the same wind to blow on all things; it puts all things in motion by the
same warmth and cold…It always preserves the same order; one day
resembles another, one year resembles the next. It always operates on one
object by the same method…Finally, it brings into existence nothing that
is useless, or destroys such an object if it be accidentally produced. (315-
316)
Comenius then argues the teacher should teach his students “in imitation of” the sun
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(316): as “the mouth of teacher is a spring from which streams of knowledge issue and
flow over them,” students must “direct their ears, eyes and thoughts towards him and
attend to everything that he tells them by word of mouth” (318). Further, Comenius says,
“If he [teacher] stands on an elevated platform, and, keeping all the scholars in his sight
at once, allow none of them to do anything but attend and look at him” (319). Even now
this “elevated platform,” a dias, still remains in most, if not all, classrooms in China
through K-16. I wonder if it implies that the teaching and learning activities in the
classroom are just another cave story in Plato – a process in which the knowledgeable
teacher leads the ignorant chained people upward to see the Sun of Truth. Therefore, as
suggested by Comenius, the teacher’s telling has to be obeyed like “the order that was
given to the worshippers in the temples of old, namely, ‘This shalt thou do’” (323).
In this sense, teaching-as-narrating/telling becomes the teacher’s possession of
students, the students’ possession of truth. If I am asked to use only one word to describe,
explain or summarize en-teaching, an alternative to direct teaching, I would say,
“Releasement,” drawn from the following conversations from Heidegger’s “Conversation
on A Country Path about Thinking” (1966/1944, 45):
Scholar: To be sure I don’t know yet what the word releasement means;
but I seem to presage that releasement awakens when our nature is let-in
so as to have dealings with that which is not a willing.
Scientist: you speak without letup of a letting-be and give the impression
that what is meant is a kind of passivity. All the same, I think I understand
that it is in no way a matter of weakly allowing things to slide and drift
along.
Scholar: Perhaps a higher acting is concealed in releasement than is found
in all the actions within the world and in the machinations of all
mankind …
Teacher: … which higher acting is yet no activity.
Scientist: Then releasement lies – if we may use the word lie – beyond the
distinction between activity and passivity …
Scholar: … because releasement does not belong to the domain of the will.
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Scientist: The transition from willing into releasement is what seems
difficult to me. (61)
In this conversation, releasement does not “will” as in the domain of modern technology,
but “awakens when our nature is let-in,” in a third space “between activity and passivity”
in which “higher acting is yet no activity.” It echoes not only the “Tao of inaction” in Lao
Tzu but the spirit of “let grow” in Dewey.  Releasement inacts but this is “in no way a
matter of weakly allowing things to slide and drift along.” If the scientist is right that the
“transition from willing into releasement” is difficult, the transition from teaching-as-
telling to en-teaching as releasement is not easier.
Through this releasement as non-willing, as discussed in chapter four, en-teaching
encourages teachers to step back to create a “void” space which possesses nothing but
accommodates everything. In this empty space, both teachers and students are put on a
journey of experiencing to learn as all of them are addressed to be responsive and thus
open to the lived calls on their own ways. Silence speaks loudest in such responses. In
brief, this “holding back” in en-teaching is quite different from that of ambitious
elevating for “right” visions or rescue as in Comenius’s simile of the teacher to the sun,
or Plato’s cave allegory and the desire for ideal knowledge transfers, as in the movie
Waiting for the Superman.
Michel Serres (1997) asserts that “humanity begins with holding back,” for it
invents weakness (117). I argue it is this weakness or vulnerability – the humanness of
teachers, not the “truth” possessed by them to instruct and thus lead their students, that
allows teachers to teach. As Serres asks, “Who, on the contrary, will sing of the modesty
of culture, of the shame of truth, of the understatement of beautiful language, of the
wisdom of restraint?” (119), I would answer, “The teacher who en-teaches.”
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The teacher who en-teaches has to be responsive to both students and
circumstances, open and vulnerable to the lived classroom calls, and be prepared to
awaken in students the readiness to grow. The en-teacher is always waiting, but not for
the arrival of the Sun of Truth or even a god (a Deus ex machina) that might come to
rescue us from darkness to light. In this patient waiting, the en-teacher watches carefully
the growth of students and listens attentively to the silent sound of blossoming in “a
vigorous fragrance” of “a wheatfield on a summer’s night.” At the same time, we become
“more waitful and more void” – “emptier, but richer in contingencies” (Heidegger,
1966/1944-45, 82). As way-giving yields possibilities in way-making, as silence
enhances speaking, as immaturity leads to growth, so en-teaching awaits for noiseless
ringing in the call of silence from the deep darkness, in a lived life.
Nowadays more Chinese educational researchers and teachers recognize the
limitations or dangers of direct teaching. In the current national curriculum reform in
China, teachers have begun to struggle with formulating possible alternatives to
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